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ATTACKING BY-LAWS: ZONING AND 
THE TRADITIONAL RULES*
G. Keith Allenf 
FORWARD
The classic definition of discrimination in the Province 
of Ontario is that of Middleton J. in Forst v. Toronto . . .  
'When the municipality is given the right to regulate,
I think that all it can do is to pass general regulations 
affecting all who come within the ambit of the munici­
pal legislation. It cannot itself discriminate, and give 
permission to one and refuse it to another.’ . . .  I share 
the doubt expressed by the learned Chief Justice wheth­
er it can ever afford a guide in dealing with a restric­
tive or zoning by-law.
These remarks by Judson J. in the Supreme Court of Can­
ada in Township of Scarborough v. Bondi1 indicate the difficul­
ties inherent in endeavouring to apply the traditional municipal 
law rules to modem concepts.
A zoning by-law is, by its very nature, discriminatory; one 
owner’s land may be subject to, what are in a sense, arbitrary 
restrictions, while his neighbour’s land is not. Under the rule 
quoted by Judson J. from Forst v. Citij of Toronto2 a by-law 
occasioning this result would be beyond the jurisdiction of a 
municipal council to enact.
The potentialities of the concept of zoning are only now 
becoming visible. The concept in its modern setting may serve 
as a useful weapon in the municipal arsenal to be applied 
against pollution, through the imposition of carefully drawn 
conditions. A concept associated to that of conditional zoning 
is that of planned unit development, which may also be of 
great assistance to the municipality in carrying out the planned 
development of its urban areas in a pleasing and orderly 
fashion.
Will the great potential of these significant changes in the 
zoning concept come to fruition? Will the traditional municipal
* This paper was submitted in partial fulfillment of the re­
quirements for the degree of Master of Laws, Osgoode Hall- 
York University, 1970. Owing to its length, this paper is 
being published in two parts. Chapters 8 through will appear 
in a subsequent issue.
t  G. Keith Allen, B.A., B.C.L. (U.N.B.), LL.M. (York), of the 
law firm of Hoyt, Mockler, Allen. Dixon and Godin, Fred­
ericton, N.B., Lecturer in the Faculty of Law, University of 
New Brunswick.
1 (1959), 18 D.L.R. (2d) 161, at p. 166. For a discussion of 
this case see in fra  c. 10.
2 (1923), 54 O.L.R. 256, at pp. 278-279.
1
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law rules assist or restrict their growth? An attempt will be 
made throughout the course of this paper to explore these tra­
ditional rules, with a view to ascertaining their applicability to 
these modem zoning concepts.
PART 1
THE FORUM AND THE NATURE OF THE SUIT
. CHAPTER 1
APPLICATIONS TO QUASH
No ground, notwithstanding its merits, of attacking a zon­
ing by-law, is effective unless it can be placed before a court of 
competent jurisdiction. In this respect, no distinction is dis­
cernible between zoning and other municipal enactments. No 
effective discussion of the grounds for attacking by-laws can be 
had without an appreciation of the problems inherent in getting 
such by-laws before the proper tribunal.
The problems intendent on an application to quash or a 
representative action will be considered in order to provide a 
framework within which to consider the grounds of attack. In 
this discussion no reference will be made to zoning per se.3
The application to quash is a summary method of attacking 
by-laws; and it is the creature of statute. Such a procedure 
was indeed foreign to the common law at the time of its intro­
duction.
Prior to the creation of this procedural remedy in Ontario, 
in the mid 1800s, the courts had difficulty in exercising a gen­
eral policing function over municipal activities. This was at­
tributable to the difficulty encountered by any interested party 
in getting municipal by-laws or resolutions properly before the 
courts. A by-law could be subjected to scrutiny only as an an­
cillary matter incidental to a normal action. A plaintiff, con­
cerned with the validity of any municipal enactment, was con­
founded by the forms of action and the rigidity of the judicial
3 The traditional grounds of attacking by-laws, and their re­
lation to zoning by-laws in particular, will be examined, 
in fra, Pt. 2. Some consideration will be given to the diffi­
culties of drafting modern legislation which does not offend 
the rules against uncertainty and delegation. Particular at­
tention will be given to the recent decisions of the Supreme 
Court of Canada in City o f Ottawa et al. v. Boyd B uilders  
Ltd., and W isivell v. M etropolitan  Corporation  o f G reater  
Winnipeg. In fra  c. 14. The significance of these decisions 
in the zoning area is not yet fully appreciated. Both cases 
deal with traditional grounds of attacking by-laws, but are 
considered of such significance as to warrant special treat­
ment.
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system. Actions could be summarily dismissed for technicial 
defects in procedure. The ultimate success in attacking the 
validity of a municipal ordinance depended on the tenacity of 
the plaintiff and the technical prowess of his counsel.
It was against this background that the summary procedur­
al remedy came into being. The radical nature of the device, 
and its simplicity, undoubtedly accounted for much of the con­
fusion apparent in the early decisions in actions where it was 
employed.
Such a statutory jurisdiction would appear to be a central 
and western Canadian phenomenon.4 No equivalent procedural 
remedy has ever been conferred on litigants in the Maritime 
provinces. The right was first conferred in Ontario, appearing 
in a statute dealing with municipal institutions in the year 1859. 
That statute provided:
In case a resident of a Municipality, or any other person 
interested in a By-law, Order or Resolution of the 
Council thereof, applies to either of the Superior Courts 
of Common Law, and produces to the Court a copy of 
the By-law, Order or Resolution, certified under the 
hand of the Clerk and under the Corporate Seal, and 
shews, by affidavit, that the same was received from the 
Clerk, and that the applicant is resident or interested as 
aforesaid, the Court, after at least eight days’ service 
on the Corporation of a Rule to shew cause in this 
behalf, may quash the By-law, Order or Resolution in 
whole or in part for illegality, and according to the 
result of the application, award costs for or against the 
Corporation.5
Most of the essential requirements of that first provision 
have been retained to the present time, although some signifi­
cant alterations, more in the nature of form than of substance, 
have taken place. These will be considered when the effect of 
judicial interpretations of the section is discussed.6 The pro­
vision, in its modern form, appears in ss. 276-280 of the current 
Ontario Municipal Act.7
4 See, for example, the provisions contained in The Municipal 
Act, R.S.O. 1960. c. 249, ss. 276-280; The Municipal Govern­
ment Act. S.A. 1968. c. 68. s. 397; Municipal Act. R.S.B.C. 
1360, c. 255. ss. 237-243; The Municipal Act, R.S.M. 1954. 
c. 173, ss. 390-393; The City Act, R.S.S. 1965, c. 147, ss. 226- 
228.
5 C.S.U.C. 1359. c. 54. s. 195.
6 This discussion forms the last two-thirds of this chapter.
7 Frequent reference is made throughout this paper to the 
Ontario Municipal Act. The complete citation of this Act 
follows. Subsequent references will cite section numbers 
only. R.S.O. 1960, s. 249, amended by S.O. 1960-61, c. 59. 
1961-62, c. 86, 1962-63, c. 87, 1964, c. 68. 1965. c. 77, 1966. 
c. 93. 1967. c. 55. 1968. c. 76. 1968-69, c. 74. 1970, cc. 14. 56. 
86, 135.
4 U.N.B. LAW  JOURNAL
In the latter part of the 19th century, with the creation of 
provinces in the Canadian West, legislators sought guidance 
from their more advanced sister province, Ontario, in the prep­
aration of their own statutes. The result was the adoption, in 
varying forms, of the summary right to apply to quash by-laws. 
However, the status requirements in these provinces has tended 
to be more restrictive than their Ontario counterpart. The right 
of application is generally confined to an applicant who is an 
elector, as opposed to a mere resident.s
Another significant departure from the Ontario procedure 
appears both in Alberta and Manitoba. In each case the appli­
cation is to a judge of the designated courts and not to the 
court itself. The judge, before whom an application is made in 
these provinces, has been held to be sitting as personna desig­
nate, and not as a judge of the designated court.9 On granting 
the initial summons the judge is thereby seized with jurisdic­
tion and must make the ultimate determination on the applica­
tion.
An application to quash a by-law' is no different from any 
other action, in the sense that the applicant or plaintiff must 
have proper status to maintain it. A lack of status in the appli­
cant deprives the court of jurisdiction to determine the matter.10
The usual method of establishing status would be for the 
applicant merely to allege his residency in the municipality, or 
the fact that he is a person interested in the by-law. If this 
statement is unchallenged by the municipal respondent, no fur­
ther or other proof thereof is necessary. If, however, in the 
pleadings, this fact is specifically denied, then the applicant 
will be required to adduce evidence to establish that he is in 
fact a person entitled under the Act to maintain the applica­
tion.11
In most instances the proof of residency should not be un­
usually difficult. It is, of course, recognized that there may be 
cases where the burden will be onerous. It is not, how'ever, 
proposed to consider what in law does or does not constitute 
residency for the purposes of this provision. The real problem 
presented is in determining whether an applicant is or is not a
8 In Manitoba the Ontario criteria of status is adopted. In 
British Columbia the applicant may be either an elector or 
a person interested. In Alberta only an elector is permitted 
to apply.
9 C handler  v. City o f V ancouver  (1919), 45 D.L.R. 121 (B.C.
C.A.): D oyle v. D ufferin  (1892), 8 Man R. 294 (C.A.).
10 Boss  v. District o f O ak Bay  (1966), 57 D.L.R. (2d) 770 
(B.C.C.A.).
11 R e H easlip  and Town o f A lam eda  (1909), 11 W.L.R. 718 (Sask. 
Dist. Ct.).
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person interested in the by-law. There is no wealth of prece­
dent dealing with this particular question, nor do the relevant 
decisions establish any real criteria as to what will satisfy the 
requirements.
The matter to be ascertained in each case is what factor is 
of such significance to a non-resident as to entitle him to call 
into question a by-law or resolution of a municipality in which 
he does not reside. It seems elementary that if an applicant 
owns property in the municipality,12 or has been convicted under 
one of its by-laws,13 his interest is clear. On the other hand a 
mere deprivation of anticipated profits from the sale of a pro­
duct prohibited within the municipality by by-law will not be 
sufficient.14
Although no clear principles can be extracted from the de­
cisions, it would appear that a particular interest, as opposed 
to a general one, must be shown to exist, such as an interference 
with a common law right to carry on a particular business or 
profession, or a discriminatory licensing by-law of the type be­
fore the Court in Jonas v. Gilbert.15 An interest shared by all 
non-residents alike would not confer the required status, unless 
some special injury was occasioned to the applicant. Some real 
and direct interference with a proprietary or civil right may in 
fact be essential.
An application to quash being of a summary nature, and 
perhaps to some extent informal, two questions with regard to 
the parties can arise — (1) the effect of joining an incorrect 
party and (2) the power of the Court to hear representations 
from persons not parties to the application.
Although the council of the municipal corporation is the 
governing body, any by-law when passed becomes a by-law of 
the corporation. A common law action to attack a by-law must 
be against the corporation. An action taken against the council 
for this purpose would probably be dismissed. In Craig v. 
Town of Qu'Appelle16 the Court considered this objection on an 
application to quash. Newlands J. concluded that this was not a 
fatal defect, holding that on this type of application the “names 
of the parties is mere surplusage”. The courts do not appear to
12 In rc D eLaH nye v. Tow nship o f the G ore o f Toronto (1852).
2 U.C.C.P. 317.
13 Re Oitawa E lectric R ailw ay Co. Ltd. v. Town o f Eastview  
(1924), 56 O.L.R. 52 (High Ct.).
j 4 R c G raham  Reid & A ssociates Ltd. and City o f W elland  
(1962), 33 D.L.R. (2d) 183 (Ont. High Ct.).
15 (1880), 5 S.C.R. 356. The by-law in question discriminated 
against non-residents, in that they were required to pay 
higher license fees than persons resident within the City.
16 (1917), 10 Sask. L.R. 307, at p. 308.
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be adverse to permitting amendments to correct errors of this 
nature.
The general rule with regard to the hearing itself is laid 
down by Irving J. in MacLean v. City of Fernie17 that no person 
except the applicant and the municipality had any status before 
the court on proceedings to quash a municipal by-law.
A rigid adherence to this rule could, in some instances, re­
sult in grave injustices to proponents of a municipal by-law. On 
some applications to quash, municipalities have not defended, 
whether through neglect, inadvertance, or a feeling of futility. 
In this situation, following the reasoning of Irving J. in the Mac- 
Lean case, no one would be entitled to uphold the impugned 
legislation before the court.
In Re Davies and Village of Forest H i U , an application 
was made to quash a by-law which required the consent of ad­
joining property owners to the installation of a swimming pool 
placed closer than a specified distance to the owner’s lot line. 
One of the property owners adjoining the applicant’s lot applied 
to the Court to be joined as a respondent.
Wells J. stated the law applicable to such an application in 
these words:19
The authorities are not entirely clear but in my opinion 
the effect of them is that where the municipality con­
cerned does not take the responsibility of upholding its 
own actions as exemplified by its by-law, then at their 
own risk as to costs other persons who are affected by 
the results may in some cases be added.
Quoting from Re Henderson and Township of West Nis- 
sotiri,20 he also states that:21
\ . . where it appears that there is an interest proper 
to be supported, and that the withdrawal of the party 
by whom it has hitherto been protected leaves it prac­
tically unrepresented before the Court’ . . . that is the 
only circumstance where a ratepayer who has rights 
under the statute to attack a by-law may be appointed 
or made a party to a proceeding with the intention of 
defending or upholding the by-law when it is attacked 
by someone else.
Presumably Wells J. did not intend to restrict the right to 
be added as a party to a ratepayer, but intended to include any 
person who could maintain an application in his own right un­
der s. 277 of the Municipal Act.
17 (1906). 12 B.C.R. 61.
18 [19651 1 O.R. 240.
19 Ibid., at p. 246.
20 (1911). 23 O.L.R. 651 (C.A.), at p. 653
21 [1965] 1 O.R., at p. 249.
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In the Davies case the municipality was proceeding dili­
gently. Hence no other party needed to be added. The adding 
of parties in this situation is a discretionary one with the judge 
hearing the application, w hich will not be lightly upset by the 
court of appeal.22
An equally serious situation can occur where the applicant 
proposes to withdraw and discontinue the application. If the 
applicant withdraws successfully, the proceeding is terminated. 
The result, under the doctrine of laches applied by the courts 
in this area, could be to preclude any other summary applica­
tion being brought.
This would be particularly unjust if the applicant is acting 
in a representative capacity for a number of qualified persons, 
and is proceeding contrary to their interests. Two proposals 
were advanced in Re Ritz and Village of New Hamburg23 to 
counteract any such result. The first was suggested by Boyd 
C.:24
When the fact is that the motion to quash is taken on 
behalf of a number of interested ratepayers who have 
combined to make the necessary deposit to answer costs, 
it is as a matter of course to allow any amendment of 
the papers so as to place that fact on record . . .  if it 
be the fact that the motion is in truth on behalf of a 
number so interested, the failure of the individual put 
forward to give a title to the proceedings to prosecute, 
or his attempt to relinquish the proceedings, should not 
prejudice the others who seek to have the matter ad­
judicated.
The second proposal was advanced by Meredith J . :25
In these circumstances, the Court is not powerless to 
prevent the bribed-6 defeat o'-’ the ratepayers’ right to 
apply to quash the by-law. Ritz, as their agent, could 
be restrained from such a breach of confidence and 
trust. A simple and ready injunction is the order pro­
posed . . . They may, and ought to. be empowered to 
continue the proceedings in Ritz’s name, on the usual 
terms of indemnifying him against costs.
These decisions indicate that the courts will not permit
22 In re S a iler  and Tow nship o f B eckiv ith  (1902), 4 O.L.R. 51 
(High Ct.); Re Cohen and City o f C algary et al. (1967). 64
D.L.R. (2d) 238 (Alta. C.A.).
23 (1902). 4 O.L.R. 639. See also M acdonald  v. City o f Toronto  
et al. (1897), 18 P.R. 17 (C.A., Chambers).
24 4 O.L.R.. at pp. 641-642.
25 Ibid., at p. 643.
26 The word “bribed” used in the judgment has reference to 
the particular facts of the case. The evidence disclosed that 
Ritz had been bribed, or at least paid to discontinue the 
action.
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rights or interests to be defeated on mere technical procedural 
points.
Another significant factor to any prospective applicant is 
the question of time. In the statutory provision of 1859, no time 
limit was established during which the application must be 
brought. The disturbing effect that could result in the munici­
pal field from permitting the bringing of applications to quash 
at any time is eminently clear. As stated by Robinson C. J. in 
Hodgson v. Municipal Council of York and Peel:21
. . .  it is not unreasonable to hold, that a party seeking 
to set it aside directly, by the summary intervention of 
this court, shouid not delay as many years as he chooses, 
but should come within a reasonable time. Here nine 
years or more have elapsed; public expense has been 
incurred . . . The inconvenience to the public might be 
very serious . . .
In Leddingham and Township of Bentinck,28 Morrison J. 
stated the laches rule in these words:
In a case of this nature, it was the duty of those parties 
opposing the action of the council, if they thought they 
had grounds for seeking the aid of this court, to come 
promptly, and not allow a year to elapse before making 
an application, allowing the parties to take proceedings 
under the resolution, incur expenses, and impose and 
collect school taxes . . .
At no time did the courts lay down any ground rules for 
ascertaining what would or would not be considered as undue 
delay. In general, the various decisions merely stated that a 
particular time was too long to permit the courts to consider the 
application. The times held unreasonable are as varied as the 
cases, one year,29 two years and nine months,30 two years,31 
fourteen months,32 eight months,33 two months34 and in one in­
27 (1856), 13 U.C.Q.B. 268, at p. 269.
28 (1869), 29 U.C.Q.B. 206, at p. 209. See also R ichardson and 
P olice C om m issioners o f  Toronto (1876), 38 U.C.Q.B. 621; 
In re Iilichie arid City o f Toronto  (1862), 11 U.C.C.P. 379 
For a somewhat contrary approach see G riffiths  v. M unici­
pality  o f G rantham  (1857), 6 U.C.C.P. 274.
29 C otter  v. M unicipality o f Darlington  (1861), 11 U.C.C.P. 265; 
Bann v. B rockv ille  (1890), 19 O.R. 409 (High Ct.); L edd in g­
ham  v. Tow nship o f  B en tin ck  (1869), 29 U.C.Q.B. 206; S hil-  
leto Drug Com pany  v. Town o f Hanna, [1931] 3 W.W.R. 108 
(Alta. Sup. Ct.).
30 In re D rope and Tow nship o f Hamilton  (1866), 25 U.C.Q.B. 
363.
31 h i re Grant and City o f Toronto  (1862), 12 U.C.C.P. 357; 
Bogart v. Town Council o f B e llev ille  (1856), 6 U.C.C.P. 425.
32 Hill v. M unicipality o f T ecum seth  (1857), 6 U.C.C.P. 297.
33 R e Robinson and V illage o f B eam sv ille  (1906), 8 O.W.R. 689 
(High Ct.).
34 R e L a k e  and City o f Toronto (1919), 16 O.W.N. 386 (High 
Ct.).
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stance two terms of the court.35 If the applicant is defeated be­
cause of laches in making the application, no other direct 
method of attack was open to him. If there was some difficulty 
in getting before the common law courts, the courts of equity 
would grant an injunction to restrain action under the by-law 
until the statutory remedy could be pursued.36 If, however, an 
injunction was applied for after the time when a common law 
court would have dismissed an application for laches, then no 
injunction would be granted.37
The policy decision of the courts not to consider an appli­
cation because of the laches of the applicant is an acceptable 
one if taken at face value, disregarding such irrelevant com­
ments on the motives of the applicant as are made in Re Mar- 
chand and Town of Tilbury.38 The difficulty inherent in this 
approach is that an illegal by-law would be permitted to stand, 
if no other action were taken, merely because of the delay in 
bringing the application. The case of Bogart v. Town Council 
of Bellville39 is a glaring example. The application had not been 
made until two years after the enactment of the by-law. Por­
tions of same were expressly declared by the Court to be ultra 
vires, and hence illegal. Notwithstanding this express finding. 
Draper C. J. refused to direct a rule absolute to quash:40
. . . where so long a delay has taken place before it was 
applied for, and particularly when the applicant dis­
closes nothing to shew he sustains, or is likely to sustain, 
any injury>i from this portion of the by-law.
This hardly seems sufficient justification for permitting the 
offending portions of the by-law to retain any semblance of 
vitality.
35 Scarlett v. Corporation  o f Y ork  (1864), 14 U.C.C.P. 161.
36 C arroll v. P erth  (1863), 10 Gr. 64.
37 G rier  v. St. V incent (1867), 13 Gr. 512; City o f London  v. 
Town o f N ew m arket (1912), 3 O.W.N. 565 (High Ct.).
38 (1917), 13 O.W.N. 14 (High Ct.), dismissed on appeal (1917).
13 O.W.N. 45 (Div. Ct.). Falconbridge C.J.K.B. dismissed an 
application to quash, holding that the applicant was pro­
ceeding from an improper motive, his intentions being 
merely to harass and embarrass the municipality, and not 
because of some injury he personally had sustained from it. 
The motives of the applicant are not a relevant considera­
tion on any application. See in this respect Re Cartivright 
and Town o f N apanee (1906), 8 O.W.R. 65 (C.A.); Re L am b  
and City o f Ottaiua (1904), 4 O.W.R. 408 (High Ct.). Some 
comments by Meredith J. A. in In re Duncan and Town o f  
M idland (1908). 16 O.L.R. 132, lend some support to the 
remarks in the M archand  case.
39 (1856), 6 U.C.C.P. 425.
40 Ibid.. at p. 428
41 See Re M cKinnon and V illage o f C aledonia  (1873), 33 U.C.- 
Q.B. 502, where the same position is taken.
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The refusal to grant a rule to quash a by-law on the ground 
of laches has some measure of reasonableness and legitimacy so 
long as no express statutory limit is placed on the time during 
which the application must be brought. The imposition of a 
one year limit for bringing such an application, must be taken 
as a statement by the legislature that an application brought 
within that time will be reasonable, irrespective of any incon­
venience caused the municipal government. Notwithstanding 
this limitation, now incorporated in s. 280 of the Municipal Act, 
the courts still subscribe to the belief that there is a discretion 
to refuse the application if not brought promptly.42
In Tavener v. Port Stanley, McManus Petroleums Ltd. et 
al.43 Laidlaw J. A., speaking for the Ontario Court of Appeal, 
found there had been no delay which would warrant the Court’s 
refusing to quash. This statement necessarily implies the right 
of the court to exercise such a discretion. Again in Township 
of Westminister and Town of Parkhill v. County of Middlesex;44 
Hope J. commented as follows:
The statutory power to quash a municipal by-law . . . 
is permissive in its terms . . . An unreasonable delay in 
moving to quash is an element to be considered. The 
explanation of delay by reason of negotiations . . .  is 
not, in my ODinion, a sufficient excuse.
The justification for such a position has long vanished. It 
is surely not asking too much to request that the courts examine 
the statutory provisions closely, discarding the pretence to a 
discretion that is clearly not given, and is no longer necessary 
or desirable.
It is submitted that under s. 280 of the Municipal Act there 
are two legitimate questions open to the court on any applica­
tion — (1) when was the offending by-law passed and (2) when 
was the application made.
The remarks of Anglin J. in City of Winnipeg v. Brock45 
are helpful in determining the answer to the first question:
In my opinion the phrase ‘the passage of the by-law’ . . . 
means a final enactment of the by-law by the municipal 
council such that no further action by it in the nature 
of confirmation or ratification is requisite in order to 
make the by-law operative or effective.
42 Re L a k e  and City o f Toronto (1919), 16 O.W.N. 386 (High 
Ct.); Re M archland and Town o f  T ilbury  (1917), 13 O.W.N.
14 (High Ct.), affirmed on anpeal; (1917), 13 O.W.N. 45 
(Div. Ct.); Re Robinson and V illage o f B eam sville  (1906),
8 O.W.R. 689 (High Ct.).
43 ri9451 4 D.L.R. 710.
44 [19451 O.W.N. 91, at pp. 91-92.
45 (1911). 45 S.C.R. 271, at p. 290.
U.N.B. LAW JOURNAL 11
When the council has done all it is required to do to make 
a by-law effective, it will be deemed to be passed for purposes 
of ascertaining the beginning of the limitation period prescribed 
by s. 280. Does the fact that some external approval or confir­
mation is necessary to instil life into the by-law extend the 
time limited for making applications to quash? Docs the time 
run from the date of such approval?
In Kuchma v. Rural Municipality of Tache,46 the Supreme 
Court of Canada considered a by-law which required provincial 
approval before becoming effective. The Act also provided that 
no application to quash could be entertained after the expira­
tion of one year from the passing of the by-law. Estey J. re­
marked:47
. . . the statutory period must be computed from the 
date of the passing of the by-law by which the munici­
pality finally attains its objective, even if the by-law 
may not be brought into force until a later date . . . 
statutory provisions requiring further acts such as reg­
istration or promulgation before a by-law becomes ef­
fective and binding do not extend the time within which 
the application to quash may be made.
In two Ontario cases48 the courts took the approach that, if 
some external body must approve the by-law, for example, a 
county council, an application to quash prior to their considera­
tion was premature and should not be entertained. These would 
appear to be at variance with the decision of Estey J., and also 
with the decision of Boyd C. in Harding v. Township of Car­
diff.*''
A zoning by-law passed by an Ontario municipality is a 
prime example of approval being required by an external 
agency.50 Such a by-law has no validity, and is not binding on 
any person, until approved by the Ontario Municipal Board. 
This approval might not be forthcoming for several years. 
Despite the logic of the statement of Meredith C. J. in Rc 
Liquor License At'f51 that applications to quash
can be taken only with respect to something that has, in 
all events, prim a facie , the force of law
an applicant wishing to quash a zoning by-law cannot afford the 
luxury of awaiting the decision of the Ontario Municipal Board.
46 [1945] S.C.R. 234.
47 Ibid., at p. 238.
48 In rc C hoate ct al. and Tow nship o f H ope (1858). 16 U.C.- 
Q.B. 424; Re C am eron and United Tow nships o f Hagarty. 
etc. (1907), 10 O.W.R. 357 (High Ct.).
49 (1882), 2 O.R. 329 (High Ct.).
50 The Planning Act, R.S.O. 1860, c. 296, s. 30(9).
51 (1913), 29 O.L.R. 475, at p. 477.
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The intent of s. 280 of the Municipal Act and its relation to 
the jurisdiction of the court in this type of application has been 
a recent subject of consideration. Wells J. in Re Clements and 
Toronto52 took the position that the section was designed mere­
ly to protect by-laws having some procedural imperfection. He 
felt that, if the by-law was clearly ultra vires, an application to 
quash could be successfully maintained at any time. This con­
clusion was not at all unreasonable in view of some of the pre­
vious decisions, particuarly those having reference to the nature 
of illegal by-laws.
There is a considerable volume of judicial opinion to the 
effect that illegal by-laws fit neatly into one of two categories, 
namely void and voidable. Freedman J. A. in Metropolitan Cor­
poration of Greater Winnipeg v. Wiswell53 adopts the following 
words from Rogers on The Law of Canadian Municipal Cor­
porations:54
The courts have made a distinction between these two 
classes of illegal by-laws. A voidable by-law is one 
that is defective for non-observance or want of compli­
ance with a statutory formality or an irregularity in 
the proceedings relating to its passage and is therefore 
liable to be quashed whereas a void by-law is one that 
is beyond the competence to enact either because of 
complete lack of power to legislate upon the subject 
matter or because of non-compliance with a prerequisite 
to its passing.
The importance of the distinction is considerable for the cur­
ative effect of a failure to quash is limited to voidable by-laws. 
The action in the Wiswell case was for a declaration that the 
by-law was bad. It was not a statutory application to quash. 
All members of the Court of Appeal were agreed that, if the by­
law was voidable only, the action could not be maintained. 
The Manitoba equivalent of s. 280 of the Ontario Municipal Act 
was treated as a statute of limitations in so far as voidable by­
laws were concerned.
In Re Gordon and The De Laval Company Ltd .55 the Court 
had considered a similar argument after the time limited for ap­
plying to quash expired. Middleton J. A. held that expiry of 
the time limit did not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdic­
tion to set aside the by-law or to grant a declaratory decree as 
to its validity.
An appeal of the Wiswell case to the Supreme Court of 
Canada produced some dissension as to whether the by-law was
52 (1959), 19 D.L.R. (2d) 476 (Ont.).
53 (1964), 45 D.L.R. (2d) 348 (Man.), at p. 352. The exact nature 
of the by-law and the grounds of attack on it are discussed, 
in fra, c. 14.
54 (1959), vol. 2, pp. 893-894.
55 [1938] O.R. 462.
void or voidable. Cartwright J., with whom Spence J. con­
curred, concluded that the by-law was voidable. He agreed 
with the conclusion in the Gordon case that this did not there­
by deprive the court of jurisdiction. With this approach the 
discussion as to whether the by-law is void or voidable in a 
common law action to attack it is of academic interest only.
Wells J. in the Clements case was merely following the lead 
of the Supreme Court. In the Kuchma case the application to 
quash was commenced three years after the passing of the by­
law. Laidlaw J. A., speaking for the Court of Appeal in the 
Clements case,56 pointed out that the summary procedure was 
purely statutory. Accepting this, whether the by-law is void or 
voidable is of no consequence on an applcation to quash, if 
that application has not been brought within one year of the 
passing of the by-law. Laidlaw J. A. said:57
There is no ambiguity whatsoever in the language. The 
effect of it is perfectly plain. The Court is precluded 
from entertaining and is forbidden to entertain an ap­
plication to quash a by-law not made within one year 
after the passing of the by-law. It is not without 
significance that the prohibition contained in the sec­
tion is not directed to the persons authorized to make 
an application. It is directed to the Court, empowered 
by s. 293(1), to quash the by-law upon an application, 
and it expressly and plainly directs that the Court shall 
not entertain an application after the specified time 
permitted for making the application.
Laidlaw J. A. concluded that, despite the restriction on jur­
isdiction under the Act, this did not detract from the common 
law right to attack by-laws by an ordinary action.58 The pro­
visions of s. 280 cannot be circumvented by a motion for a dec­
laration that a by-law does not apply in a given situation.59 
The attack must be made in an action commenced by a writ of 
summons.
A failure to comply with the statutory prerequisites for the 
bringing of the application will be fatal,60 for example, not en­
tering into the proper recognizance.61
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56 (1959), 20 D.L.R. (2d) 497. See also Re M erry and City o f  
Trail (1962), 34 D.L.R. (2d) 594 (B.C.C.A.); V andecar  v. 
C orporation  o f East O xford  (1878), 3 O.A.R. 131.
57 20 D.L.R. (2d), at p. 499.
58 See also L acey  v. V illage o f Port S tanley, [1968] 1 O.R. 36 
(High Ct.).
59 Sun Oil Co. v. City o f H am ilton, [1961] O.R. 209 (C.A.).
60 Re M erry and City o f Trail (1962), 34 D.L.R. (2d) 594 (B.C. 
C.A.).
61 Re Burton and V illage o f A rthur (1894), 16 P.R. 160 (High 
Ct.).
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In some of the earlier cases it was argued quite strenuously 
that the application must not only be served, but heard as well, 
before the expiration of the statutory time limit. It is now set­
tled, at least in Ontario,62 that the serving and filing of the nec­
essary papers is a commencement of the application sufficient 
to satisfy the statute.
There would seem to be one exception to the rule on the 
expiration of time. In some instances the municipality must 
give notice of the enactment of an ordinance, and set out the 
time in which an application to quash must be served. If the 
information provided is incorrect, and necessarily leads to an 
application being made after the effluxion of the statutory time, 
the corporation will be estopped from raising any objection.63 
The rights of the applicant cannot be so easily displaced.
Since power conferred on the courts to quash is completely 
statutory,64 jurisdiction other than that prescribed by the statute 
cannot be conferred or extended and the statutory requirements 
cannot be waived by the parties to an application.65
The motion that is served on the municipal respondent 
must set out the grounds of illegality.66 If this is not done an 
amendment will invariably be permitted.67 A mere allegation 
that the by-law is ultra vires will be considered a sufficient 
statement of the illegality.68
Under some of the earlier statutes no action could be taken 
against a municipal corporation until one month after the quash­
ing of the by-law which authorized the act complained of. By- 
dismissing an application for laches, the courts were in some 
instances depriving an applicant of any legal remedy for injury
62 R e S w eelm an  and Town o f G osfield  (1889), 13 P.R. 293 
(High Ct.); Re Shaw  and City o f St. Thom as  (1899), 18 P.R. 
454 (C.A.); Bearss  v. City o f R egina  (1956), 5 D.L.R. (2d) 
199 (Sask. C.A.); but see the remarks of Tysoe J. A. in Re 
M erry and City o f Trail (1962), 34 D.L.R. (2d) 594 (B.C.C.A.).
63 In re  Robertson  et al. and Tow nship o f  N orth Easthope  
(1888), 15 O.R. 423 (High Ct.); K an e  v. City o f K aslo  (1896),
4 B.C.R. 436 (Sup. Ct.).
64 Re M ajor Hill T axicab arid T ran sfer Co. L im ited  and City 
o f Ottawa (1915), 33 O.L.R. 243 (C.A.); S hepherd  v. City o f  
M ontreal (1917), 36 D.L.R. 437 (Que. Ct. of Review).
65 Re Angus and Tow nship o f W iddifield  (1911), 23 O.L.R. 479 
(Div. Ct.); Re M erry and City o f  Trail (1962), 34 D.L.R. (2d) 
594 (B.C.C.A.).
66 Re St. B on iface C harter  (1912), 22 Man L.R. 27 (K.B.).
67 In re Toion o f M elville  (1952), 6 W.W.R. (N.S.) 357 (Sask. 
Dist. Ct.).
68 Re W etm orc and Town o f Timm ins, [1952] O.R. 13 (High 
Ct.).
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sustained by him. The same result flows from the exercising of 
a discretion to quash on the merits.
In Haynes v. Copeland69 a replevin action was started for
ment by-law. Wilson . ;sed the action, there being no
illegality apparent on the face of the by-law. He stated that 
the proper remedy was an application to quash. The difficulty 
of the plaintiff was obvious. Having commenced this “abortive” 
action, his delay in applying to quash would be fatal to any ap-
Slication of a summary nature. The net result was a complete eprivation of his rights and property, with no opportunity of 
having his title to the goods judicially declared. In Wilson v. 
County of Middlesex,70 on the other hand, Robinson C. J. felt 
that in many cases, if a replevin action must await the quashing 
of the by-law, it would be useless.
The decision of WTilson J. was consistent with the early de­
cisions to the effect that no action of any description could be 
maintained until the illegal by-law was removed. It was soon 
apparent that such a rigid approach could place a plaintiff in 
an intolerable position in that his rights and property would be 
completely destroyed before the legality of the by-law could be 
determined. Despite a reluctance to consider the validity of a 
by-law in a collateral proceeding, it was felt that an illegal act 
causing injury should be halted forthwith, rather than await 
the determination of another application.71 It was concluded 
that only in an action for damages against the corporation must 
the by-law first be removed.72 This development eliminated at 
least one of the more glaring injustices.
As seen from s. 195 of the statutes relating to municipal in­
stitutions in 1859,73 an applicant was required to produce a copy 
of the offending by-law, duly authenticated by tne clerk of the 
municipality. The court then, in the language of the statute, 
“may quash the By-law, Order or Resolution in whole or in part 
for illegality”. The wording of this section produced two re­
sults — (1) the use of the word “may” gave the court a discre­
tion to quash the by-law, whether illegal or not, and (2) unless 
the illegality appeared on the face of the by-law it could not be 
quashed.
69 (1868), 18 U.C.C.P. 150. Reid  v. City o f H am ilton  (1856), 5 
U.C.C.P. 269, is to the same effect.
70 (1859), 18 U.C.Q.B. 348.
71 Rose  v. Tow nship o f West W awanosh et al. (1890), 19 O.R. 
294 (High Ct.); M alott v. Tow nship o f M ersea  (1885), 9 O.R. 
611 (High Ct.).
72 Hill v. M iddagh et al. (1889), 16 O.A.R. 356.
73 C.S.U.C. 1859, c. 54.
the return of personal levied under a local improve-
The conclusion that the illegality must be apparent on the 
face of the by-law resulted from the requirement to produce 
the by-law. If the alleged illegality was not apparent on the 
face of the by-law, there was no statutory jurisdiction to quash.74 
In addition to this limited statutory power, the court had an in­
herent common law jurisdiction to quash for defects in proce­
dure or for any illegality shown by extraneous evidence.75 These 
same authorities drew an important distinction between the stat­
utory power to quash, and the common law right. While acting 
under the common law jurisdiction the decision to quash was 
discretionary with the court, whereas under the statute the duty 
to quash was mandatory. This important distinction has sub­
sequently been ignored. One can only conclude that the foun­
dation for the discretion accepted by the courts does not sup­
port the edifice erected on it.
The judgment of Bums J. in Grierson v. County of On­
tario76 is the one most often quoted as supporting the discre­
tionary power to quash for an illegality not appearing on the 
face of the by-law. He stated the law in these words:77
. . . the true construction to give to the powers vested 
in the court to quash by-laws is, that, unless the by­
law be illegal on the face of it, it rests discretionary 
with the court, upon extraneous matters, to say whether 
there is such a manifest illegality that it would be un­
just that the by-law should stand, or that it had been 
fraudulently or improperly obtained.
Burns J. did not refer to the statutory power of the court to 
quash, but to the power generally. In the same case Robinson 
C. J. emphatically stated that, when the illegality is shown by 
extraneous evidence, the jurisdiction to quash is one existing at 
common law, and not conferred by statute.
It was subsequently concluded that the power to quash was 
purely statutory and that there was such right at common law. 
It followed as a necessary corollary to this that the right to 
quash on extraneous evidence must also have been conferred 
by the statute. Only a portion of the early contention was dis­
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74 S utherland  v. Tow nship o f East N issouri (1853), 10 U.C.Q.B. 
626; Boulton and Town o f P eterborough  (1858), 16 U.C.Q.B. 
380; Standley  and M unicipality o f V espra and Sunnidale  
(1859), 17 U.C.Q.B. 69.
75 Boulton and Town o f P eterborou gh  (1858), 16 U.C.Q.B. 380; 
In re Hill and Tow nship o f W alsingham  (1851), 9 U.C.Q.B. 
310; G rierson  v. County o f Ontario (1952), 9 U.C.Q.B. 
623 (Robinson C. J .); K elly  and City o f  Toronto (1864^, 23 
U.C.Q.B. 425; Sutherland  v. Tow nship o f  East Nissouri (1853),
10 U.C.Q.B. 626.
76 (1852), 9 U.C.Q.B. 623.
77 Ibid.. at p. 632.
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carded, that is, the view there was a common law right to quash. 
The discretion previously alleged to exist under the common 
law right was retained. This was in the face of those same de­
cisions which discounted any discretionary power if the motion 
to quash was made under the statute.
Various positions were adopted by the courts on the ques­
tion of discretion. There is authority for the proposition that 
there is always a discretion, no matter how the illegality is 
shown.78 It has even been held that the discretion to quash 
should not be exercised in a case where the electors had not ap-
{>roved a by-law as required under the Act but there was a de- ay in making the application.79 In another instance, where a 
large number of electors was improperly prevented from vot­
ing on a by-law but the applicant was not one of them, it was 
held that no order should be made.80 Neither decision is sup­
portable.81
It eventually became accepted that if the illegality was ap­
parent on the face of the by-law then it must be quashed, there 
being no discretion.82 On the other hand, if the illegality was 
established by extraneous evidence, it rested discretionary with 
the court to quash or not.83 This remains an accepted judicial 
position.84
78 L ou gheed  v. District o f  Surrey  (1957), 22 W.W.R. 504 (B.C. 
C.A.); In re  Duncan and Town o f M idland  (1907), 16 O.L.R.
132 (Garrow J. A.); R e Platt v. City o f  Toronto (1872), 33 
U.C.Q.B. 53.
79 In re S h eley  and Tow n o f W indsor (1864), 23 U.C.Q.B. 569.
80 Bann  v. B rockv ille  (1890), 19 O.R. 409 (High Ct.).
81 See Re L am b  and City o f O ttawa (1904), 4 O.W.R. 408 (High 
Ct.).
82 Re H oward and City o f Toronto  (1927), 61 O.L.R. 563 (C.A.); 
R e M iddleton and Tow nship o f G oderich , [1931] O.R. 392 
(High Ct.); Sim m ons and Tow nship o f C hatham  (1861), 21 
U.C.Q.B. 75; Re W etm ore and Tow n o f Tim m ins, [1952] O.R. 
13 (High Ct.).
83 Re Robinson and V illage o f B eam sv ille  (1906), 8 O.W.R. 689 
(High Ct.); Re H ow ard and City o f Toronto (1927), 61 O.L.R. 
563 (C.A.); R ex ex  rel. Donald  v. Thom pson  (1929), 24 Sask. 
L.R. 4 (C.A.); In  re  L loyd  and Tow nship o f E lderslie  (1879), 
44 U.C.Q.B. 235; R e C aldw ell and Tow n o f G alt (1905), 10
O.L.R. 618 (High Ct.); In re  R obertson  et al. and T ow nship  
o f North E asthope  (1888), 15 O.R. 423 (High Ct.); S ecord  and  
County o f  L incoln  (1864), 24 U.C.Q.B. 142; T aprell v. City  
o f C algary  (1913), 5 Alta. L.R. 377 (Sup. Ct. en banc); Re 
B rew er an d  City o f Toronto  (1909), 19 O.L.R. 411 (C.A.); 
Lanson and Tow nship o f  R each  (1860), 19 U.C.Q.B. 591; R e  
Brow n and City o f C arlgary  (1906), 5 W.L.R. 576 (N.W.T. 
Sup. Ct.).
84 Re M iddleton and Tow nship o f G oderich , [1931] O.R. 392 
(High Ct.); Re W etm ore and. Town o f Tim m ins, [1952] O.R.
13 (High Ct.).
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S. 277(1) of the present Ontario Municipal Act permits the 
court to quash for illegality. There is no longer any justification 
for differentiating as to die manner in which the illegality is 
shown. The entire problem has arisen through a misinterpreta­
tion of the section. The section does nothing more nor less than 
confer a jurisdiction on the courts which did not exist at com­
mon law. As stated by Meredith J. in Cartwright v. Town of 
Napanee:85
That legislation was enacted for the purpose of creating 
the power to quash, not of indicating the circumstances 
under which the power should be exercised, nor whether 
the power is or is not discretionary. It means no more 
than that it shall be lawful for a Judge of the High 
Court to qiash on summary motion.
If a by-law could be rectified by the council that passed it 
merely by enacting a new one, it usually would be permitted 
to stand.86 This seems a doubtful justification for an illegal en­
actment.
Similarly, the courts have exercised this discretion to refuse 
a motion to quash when the objections to the by-law were of a 
highly technical nature,87 when the objections were frivolous,88 
where there was doubt as to the validity of the objections,89 or 
where there had been substantial compliance with the enabling 
legislation.90
In one instance it was suggested that, since the amount in­
volved was trivial, the application should be refused.91 Surely 
this is an indefensible position for a court of justice. In all 
cases where the application was dismissed because of laches or 
because the illegality was established by extraneous evidence,
85 (1905), 11 O.L.R. 69 (High Ct.), at p. 70.
86 Re B u llerw orth  and City o f O ttawa (1918), 44 O.L.R. 84 
(C.A.).
87 H addock  v. District o f N orth C ow ichan  (1966), 59 D.L.R. 
(2d) 392 (B.C. Sup. Ct.); Re Jon es  and City o f London  (1899),
30 O.R. 583 (High Ct.); W innipeg M erchandisers L im ited  v. 
City o f W innipeg, [1936] 3 W.W.R. 530 (K.B.); T aylor and  
Tow nship o f West W illiam s (1870), 30 U.C.Q.B. 337; Re La~ 
bute and Tow nship o f T ilbury North  (1918), 44 O.L.R. 522 
(C.A.).
88 In re S im m ons and Tow nship o f C hatham  (1861), 21 U.C.Q.B. 
75.
89 In re F enn ell and Town o f  G uelph  (1865), 24 U.C.Q.B. 238.
90 Re C am eron  and City o f V ictoria  (1905), 2 W.L.R. 387 (B.C.
C.A.); In re  Huson and Tow nship o f South N orw ich  (1892),
19 O.A.R. 343; Pringle  v. City o f W innipeg  (1951), 3 W.W.R. 
(N.S.) 570 (B.C. Sup. Ct.); In re  C asw ell and Rural Munici­
pality  o f South N orfolk  (1905), 15 Man. R. 620 (K.B.); Grant 
and Tow nship o f Puslinch  (1868), 27 U.C.Q.B. 154.
91 Re P latt v. City o f Toronto  (1872), 33 U.C.Q.B. 53.
a proper exercise of discretion warranted its dismissal. How 
much less confusing the record would be if the applications had 
been dismissed because there had been substantial compliance 
with the statute, or because objections were too technical, or on 
some similar basis, rather than on what prima facie has the ap­
pearance of an arbitrary conclusion.
The applicant, like a plaintiff in any other action, must 
establish a sufficiently strong basis for the intervention of the 
court.92. If the illegality is clearly shown, whether on the face 
of the by-law, or by extraneous evidence, the applicant is en­
titled as of right to a decision.93 Any other conclusion is an im­
proper usurpation of power by the court.
Harrison C. J. in Re Mace and County of Frontenac94 sug­
gested the following principles for the guidance of the courts:
Those who were opposed to the by-law, whether few 
or many, have been constrained to submit to its pro­
visions under the belief that it was a valid by-law. 
Those who were in favour of it, whether few or many, 
have, under a similar belief, obtained the benefit of its 
provisions. But now, when it is apparent to all that 
the by-law was illegally carried, and so is an illegal 
by-law, it is time that the delusion under which all 
have been acting should be removed, and the truth be 
revealed and acted upon for the future.
A relatively straight forward test was advanced by Killam 
J. in Hall v. Rural Municipality of South Norfolk:95
. . .  if the circumstances are such that the by-law must 
be held invalid if objected to in another proceeding, it 
should be quashed on application.
What is the result of not quashing an illegal by-law? The 
summary procedure was designed to provide a simple, inex­
pensive and expeditious means of removing invalid legislation.96 
It is clear that a refusal to quash does not validate the question­
able by-law.97 The end result of a refusal to quash, where il­
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92 N apier  v. City o f  W innipeg  (1960), 67 Man. R. 322 (Q.B.).
93 There are decisions to the contrary: In  re  Duncan and  
Town o f M idland  (1907), 16 O.L.R. 132 (Meredith J. A.); In  
re W hite and Tow nship o f Sandw ich East (1882), 1 O.R. 530 
(High Ct.).
94 (1877), 42 U.C.Q.B. 70, at pp. 87-88. See also Re Fenton  et al. 
v. County o f S im coe  (1885), 10 O.R. 27 (High Ct.); Re S tin­
son and Town o f Fort Frances  (1918), 14 O.W.N. 196 (High 
Ct.).
95 (1892), 8 Man. R. 430, at p. 439.
96 C artw right v. Town o f N apanee  (1905), 11 O.L.R. 69 (High 
Ct.).
97 In re R evell and County o f O xford  (1877), 42 U.C.Q.B. 337.
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legality is established, is more litigation, greater expense and 
uncertainly to all parties concerned.98
If the by-law is withdrawn by the municipality after the 
action has been commenced, the courts may treat this as an 
acknowledgment of illegality and award costs to the applicant.99 
No formal order will issue. The same procedure will no doubt 
be followed if the force of the by-law is spent, for example, the 
case of a by-law limited to expire at a time which has passed 
before the motion is heard.
It is submitted that, if the courts on a motion to quash; 
would merely answer the following questions, an applicant 
could be reasonably assured of having the merits of his applica­
tion determined:
(1) Has the applicant complied with all of the statutory
prerequisites essential to the bringing of the application?
(2) Does the applicant have proper status to maintain the
application?
(3) Is the application in time?
(4) Is the illegality clearly established?
If all questions are answered in the affirmative there are 
no other factors to be considered and the order quashing the 
by-law should issue. Laches and the manner in which the il­
legality of the ordinance is established are no longer relevant or 
legitimate considerations.
CHAPTER 2
ACTIONS RESULTING FROM BY-LAW VIOLATIONS
The potential problems emanating from a breach of a mu­
nicipal by-law are more clearly evident through example. Based 
on the following example a consideration of some of these ques­
tions will be made.
In an area zoned single family residential, A maintains an 
expensive dwelling. A structure on adjoining property is used 
for the purpose of manufacturing fire works. The use is not 
sufficiently vexatious to constitute an actionable nuisance. The 
fire hazard created by such user is relatively high, and has re-
98 Lanson and Tow nship o f R each  (1860), 19 U.C.Q.B. 591; 
S tandley  and M unicipality o f V espra and Sunnidale (1859),
17 U.C.Q.B. 69; Re M illoy and Tow nship o f Onondaga (1884),
6 O.R. 573 (High C t); Re Ostrom and Tow nship o f Sidney. 
(1888), 15 O.A.R. 372.
99 In re  C olem an  (1859), 9 U.C.Q.B. 146.
rsulted in a marked depreciation in value of A’s property and a 
dramatic increase in his fire insurance rates. Despite numerous 
complaints and demands, the municipality refuses to enforce the 
zoning by-law. It is assumed that A has no statutory right of 
enforcement.
Consequent to this violation there are two clearly discern­
ible questions — (1) can A obtain an injunction to restrain the 
breach of the by-law and (2) can A successfully maintain an 
action for compensation for the damages caused to him by the 
violation.
Whether A can enforce the by-law direcdy:
. . . must, to a great extent, depend on the purview of
the legislature in the particular statute, and the language
which they have there employed . . .10°
The mere fact that the legislation in question does not con­
fer in express terms a right of enforcement in an individual does 
not of necessity preclude such a right. The statute, or by-law, 
must be examined in toto to determine if it was enacted for the 
benefit of the public at large, a particular class or an individual. 
If a statutory right is conferred on an individual, and no partic­
ular method of enforcement prescribed, the court will not per­
mit the abrogation of that right. If the statutory benefit is de­
signed for a particular class, the right of a member of that class 
to proceed in his own right will be much more readily implied. 
Even in this situation the scheme and intention of the legisla­
tion must still be determined.101
If the performance of certain duties are required for the 
benefit of a class, and no penalties for non-compliance are pre­
scribed, the assumed intention is that the performance of these 
duties can be enforced by any class member. If, on the other 
hand, detailed penalties are prescribed by the statute for a fail­
ure to carry out the obligations, the assumed intention is that 
any remedy must be found within the four corners of the stat­
ute. The conclusion is that the legislature did not intend a 
wrongdoer to be subjected to any other penalty than that set
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100 Lord Cairns, L.C. in A tkinson  v. N ew castle W aterw orks Co. 
(1877), 2 Ex.D. 441, at p. 448. These remarks were accepted 
in John ston  et al. v. C onsum m ers’ G as Com pany o f Toronto, 
[1898] A.C. 447 (P.C.), at pp. 454-455.
101 John ston  et al. v. Consum m ers’ Gas Com pany o f  Toronto, 
[1898] A.C. 447. In the A tkinson  case, as a condition of be­
ing permitted to supply water to the community, the de­
fendant was to perform certain defined public acts, and in 
default of such performance could be subjected to penal­
ties. It was held not to be the scheme of this legislation to 
confer any right of action on an individual member of the 
community.
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out.102 As stated by Lord Halsbury L. C. in Pasmore v. Oswald- 
twistle Urban District Council:103
The principle that where a specific remedy is given by 
a statute, it thereby deprives the person who insists up­
on a remedy of any other form of remedy than that 
given by the statute, is one which is very familiar and 
runs through the law. I think Lord Tenterden accur­
ately states that principle in the case of Doe v. B ridges  
(1881), 1 B. & Ad. 847, at p. 859. He says: ‘where an 
Act creates an obligation and enforces the performance 
in a specified manner, we take it to be a general rule 
that performance cannot be enforced in any other man­
ner.’
The real determination which must be made in any action 
to enforce a by-law is whether or not the scheme of the legisla­
tion is to protect a class of which the plaintiff is a member.104 
The case of Orpen v. Roberts105 is significant in this context. A 
by-law required a specified set back from the street line. An 
action was commenced for an injunction to restrain a breach of 
this provision. Duff J. in the Supreme Court of Canada said:
. . . this leaves to be determined in each case whether 
the enactment relied upon was passed for the benefit of 
the person asserting the right to reparation or other 
relief. . . .  to quote Lord Selborne in Brian  v. Thom as 
(1881), 50 L .J.Q B . 662, ‘Where a statute creates an 
offence and defines particular remedies against com­
mitting that offence, prim a fa c ie  the party injured can 
avail himself of the remedies so defined and no others.’
But the object and provisions of the statute as a whole 
must be examined with a view to determining whether 
it is a part of the scheme of the legislation to create, 
fcr the benefit of individuals, rights enforceable by 
action: or whether the remedies provided by the statute 
are intended to be the sole remedies available by way 
of guarantees to the public for the observance of the 
statutory duty, or by way of compensation to individ­
uals who have suffered by reason of the non-perform­
ance of that duty.
The Court concluded that it was not the intention of the 
legislative body to confer any right of action on an individual. 
The by-law was one for the public benefit.
This principle is concisely stated by Wilson J. in Singer v. 
Town N’Country Holding Co. Ltd.:101
102 Orpen  v. R oberts, [1925] S.C.R. 364.
103 [1898] A.C. 387 (H.L.), at p. 394.
104 G illies  v. Bortoluzzi (1952), 6 W.W.R. (N.S.) 633 (Man Q.B.); 
T om pkins  v. T he B rockv ille  R ink Com pany  (1899), 31 O.R. 
124 (High Ct.).
105 [1925] S.C.R.. 364. See also T ch ap ero ff v. City o f V ictoria, 
[1948] 2 W.W.R. 722 (B.C. Sup. Ct.).
106 [1925] S.C.R., at p. 370.
107 (1966), 56 D.L.R. (2d) 339 (Man. Q.B.), at p. 344.
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But where, as here, a by-law is enacted in the general 
public interest, and a duty is cast by statute for the en­
forcement thereof, this last is a bar to any right which 
might be claimed by a property owner or other citizen to 
sue for such enforcement, unless such right is incor­
porated in the by-law itself . . .
In Village of St. Johns v. McFarlan108 Morston J. considered 
the jurisdiction of the court to act:
A Court in chancery has no jurisdiction to restrain the 
threatened violation of a village ordinance, unless the 
act threatened to be done, if carried out, would be a 
nuisance.
It can, at the very least, be stated that a very heavy onus 
will be placed on any plaintiff attempting to assert any right to 
direct action. It would also seem to be elementary that a mu­
nicipality cannot confer any such right on its residents, unless 
it is specifically authorized by statute so to do. Charged with 
the duty of enforcing the by-law, the municipality could not 
delegate such duty to a rate payer. A duty to prosecute in­
volves a discretion which cannot be effectively reviewed or con­
trolled by the courts.109 A mandamus can only be issued to 
compel the performance of a duty. It cannot compel the exer­
cising of a discretion in a particular way.
Given these principles, how is the court likely to approach 
a zoning by-law? What are the possibilities of a right of en­
forcement being given to A?
A zoning by-law is primarily a statement of municipal 
policy as to what is the highest and best use of land within the 
area administered by the corporation. To carry this policy to 
fruition, different uses are allocated to particular districts, and 
penalties imposed for violations.110
In view of the decisions and the nature of a zoning by-law, 
it seems clear that, apart from statute, A’s only remedy is to 
work diligently at the next municipal election to obtain a more 
sympathetic council. A zoning by-law does create protection 
for a property owner, such as preventing the intrusion of objec­
tionable uses. This proposition is one that has been accepted 
by the Ontario Municipal Board as justification for refusing to 
approve by-laws intended to introduce changes in residential 
areas, such as a major increase in density, or the creation of 
commercial or industrial uses. This is not, however, sufficient
108 (1876), 33 Mich. 72.
109 N orfolk  v. R oberts  (1914), 50 S.C.R. 283.
110 For a consideration of the principles of zoning, reference 
should be made to V illage o f Euclid  v. A m bler R ealty  Co. 
(1926), 272 U.S. 365. and Tow nship o f S carborough  v. Bondi 
(1959), 18 D.L.R. (2d) 161 (Can. Sup. Ct.).
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to import an intention into a by-law to benefit a specific class, 
at least to the extent of permitting them to maintain an action 
to enforce its provisions.
Under s. 525 of the Municipal Act of 1937 a municipality 
had the authority to restrain the erection and user of lands or 
buildings in contravention of any by-law enacted under the 
authority of that Act. Apart from statute, the position of the 
municipality was not completely free from doubt. In District 
of Oak Bay v. Gardner111 the Court refused to grant a manda­
tory injunction for the removal of a structure erected in viola­
tion of the building by-law. It was held that the principles of 
public nuisance were applicable and only the Attorney-General 
could maintain such an action.
In 1944 s. 525 was amended to permit a ratepayer of the 
municipality to exercise equivalent rights of enforcement.112 
By a further amendment in 1946 the statutory right was broad­
ened to include the enforcement of any by-laws passed under 
the authority of the Municipal Act.113 The final change ap­
peared in the general statutory revision of 1950 at which time 
the section was made applicable to all by-laws, whether enacted 
under the authority of the Municipal Act or any other special 
or general act.114 This provision is now incorporated in s. 486 
of the present Municipal Act.
The ratepayer in the position of A in the example could 
proceed immediately to enforce the by-law under s. 486 of the 
Municipal Act, without being in any way dependent on the 
action of the municipal government.115
The question of whether A can maintain an action for 
damages as a result of the by-law violation must now be con­
sidered. The act of which A is complaining is not one pro­
hibited by the common law. The mere fact that the by-law 
prohibits the use A’s neighbour is making of his land does not 
thereby create a cause of action in A. He must have status to 
maintain any action, or as suggested in Tchaperoff v. City of 
Victoria110 the by-law must vest in him some proprietary right.
111 (1914), 19 B.C.R. 391 (C.A.).
112 S.O. 1944, c. 39, s. 48, amending s. 525 of R.S.O. 1937, c. 266.
113 S.O. 1946, c. 60, s. 67, amending s. 525 of R.S.O. 1937, c. 266, 
as amended by S.O. 1944, c. 40, s. 48.
114 R.S.O. 1950. c. 243, s. 497.
115 The effectiveness of the right is adequately demonstrated 
by such cases as P ow ell and Ford  v. H oward, [1949] O.W.N. 
497 (High Ct.) and Long  v. R oberts et al., [1966] 1 O.R. 771 
(High Ct.).
116 [1948] 2 W.W.R. 722 (B.C. Sup. Ct.).
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There appear to be certain valid reasons for not permitting 
civil actions based on violations of municipal by-laws. Munici­
pal governments have power to interfere in innumerable matters 
which under the common law could be pursued with impunity. 
It is difficult to believe that the legislature should ever have 
intended that a violation of a local by-law would create a civil 
liability.117 The situation under which rights would be thereby 
createa would vary from municipality to municipality.118 A 
mere violation without more should never be sufficient.
The proposal advanced by Hayne C. in McCloskey v. Krel- 
ing119 is a reasonable approach to a difficult problem:
If we assume that the ordinance gives a right of action 
by private persons, it can only be to those who suffer 
damage by reason of its violation, and this damage must 
be special, and not as is common to the public. The de­
fendant’s building . . . would naturally cause to others 
more or less of the same depreciation in value and in­
crease of insurance rates from which it would seem the 
plaintiff suffers. Hence there is no damage that is spe­
cial to him. Depreciation in value is not a ground of 
special damage . . .  The injury ‘must be special in 
character, and not merely greater in degree, than that 
of the general public.'
This decision does not answer specifically the question of 
whether or not such action is maintainable. The Court does not 
directly consider this problem, but merely sets out what is re­
quired if that fact is assumed. The question still remains, does 
a violation of a zoning by-law constitute a wrong actionable at 
the suit of the injured party?
The Supreme Court of Canada in Sterling Trusts Corpora­
tion et al. v. Postma120 had occasion to consider the effect of a 
violation of a provincial motor vehicle act provision. An acci­
dent had resulted from the failure of the defendant to main­
tain lighted tail-lights on his vehicle. Cartwright J. in found­
ing a cause of action upon the violation said:121
I think it plain that once it has been found (i) that 
the respondents committed a breach of the statutory 
duty to have the tail-light lighted, and (ii) that the 
breach was an effective cause of the appellant’s injuries, 
the respondents are prim a fa c ie  liable for damages suf­
fered by the appellant.
It can be proved by A that his neighbour has violated the
117 Tom pkins  v. The B rcck v ille  R ink Com pany  (1899), 31 O.R. 
124 (High Ct.).
118 H arvkes v. Y eom ans, [1954] O.W.N. 769 (C.A.).
119 (1888), 18 P. 433 (Cal. Sup. Ct.), at p. 434-435.
120 [1965] S.C.R. 324.
121 Ibid., at pp. 329-330.
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zoning by-law, and that this violation was the effective cause 
of the injury he sustained. The test has been met.
Cartwright J. pointed out that the provision with which he 
was concerned was designated for the protection of other users 
of the highway. The only real conclusion to be drawn from the 
decision is that, if a statutory provision is designated for the 
protection of a specified class, any breach of that duty which 
results in an injury to a member of the class will be action­
able.122 The crux of the problem is simply the purpose for 
which a zoning by-law is enacted. Is it enacted for the benefit 
of a specified class? It is submitted that a zoning by-law is not 
one enacted for this limited purpose, but is one designed to fur­
ther the interests of, and protect all members of, the municipal­
ity, not merely some particular segment thereof. Assuming the 
validity of these statements, it is submitted that a violation of a 
zoning by-law would not constitute an actionable wrong.
If the principle in the Sterling Trusts case does apply it is 
submitted that the type of injury for which recompense can be 
obtained must be restricted to that indicated in the McCloskey 
case. On this approach A could not maintain an action unless 
he sustained some special injury not common to the public. 
Violations of zoning ordinances do not generally result in spe­
cial injury to an individual owner. The injury sustained may be 
greater in degree, but this will not make it special. The situa­
tions where a violation of a zoning by-law will be sufficient to 
sustain an action for damages are extremely limited.
CHAPTER 3
NON-STATUTORY RIGHTS OF ACTION 
Declaratory Actions
It is not proposed to consider in detail the technicalities of 
this type of action. Some of the problems which have arisen in 
municipal law cases where declaratory judgments have been 
sought will be pointed out. Some detailed studies of the overall 
problems connected with this type of action are available.123
It is perhaps not completely correct to refer to a declara­
tory action as being purely non-statutory. In some jurisdictions 
the Rules of Court set out the situations where this type of pro­
ceeding is available.124
122 In M aker  v. D avanne Holdings L im ited , [1954] O.R. 935 
(High Ct.), a nuisance action, the Court was prepared to 
grant an interim injunction based on a violation of the 
zoning by-law.
123 Reference can be made to Derril T. Warren, The D eclara­
tory Ju dgm en t: R eview ing A dm inistrative Actions (1966),
44 Can. Bar Rev. 610.
124 See, for example, Rule 604 of the Ontario Rules of Court.
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The right of a resident of a municipality in New Brunswick 
to seek a declaration from the Court is of considerable impor­
tance. There is in that province no right to summarily attack a 
by-law.125
This type of action is equally important in Ontario where 
a ratepayer has permitted the time limited for quashing a by­
law to expire. It is clear, as already indicated,126 that no matter 
how illegal the by-law may be the right to proceed summarily 
is lost on the expiration of the time set out in s. 280 of the 
Ontario Municipal Act.
Where declaratory relief is sought, the status of the plain­
tiff is probably no less important than in any other action. 
What as a general rule will be required to establish status is set 
out in the judgment of Donovan J. in Johanson v. City of Win­
nipeg.121
It must remain, however, as a basis for such petition or 
claim for such declaration, as it is, generally speaking, 
for any right of action, that the petitioner must have 
more than a general or political or public interest as a 
citizen in such by-law. It must, it seems to me, be 
shown that he has such a personal interest as affects 
or reasonably may affect him in respect of some right 
affecting his status, person or property.i-**
In the cases where a declaratory judgment has been sought, 
the interest decreed essential by Donovan J. has not always 
been clearly evident.129 In the majority of these cases the ques­
125 S.M.T. (E astern ) L im ited  et al. v. City o f Saint Jo h n  (1945),
18 M.P.R. 374 (N.B.Ch.D.). See also Town o f St. L eon ard  v. 
Fournier  (1956), 3 D.L.R. (2d) 315 (N.B.), at p. 322, where 
Bridges J., after referring to an order made by the trial 
judge said: “He stated that he set it aside. With deference, 
I think that the most a Court in this Province can do is to 
declare it invalid, illegal and void.”
126 Supra, pp. 13-14.
127 (1935), 43 Man. R. 201, at p. 203.
128 See also, on the question of status, Youl v. Ewing, [1904]
I.R. 434.
129 P ease  v. Town o f M oosomin  (1901), 5 Terr. L.R. 207; P ar­
sons v. City o f London  (1911), 25 O.L.R. 172 (High Ct.); 
Way v. City o f St. Thom as et al. (1906), 12 O.L.R. 240 (Div. Ct.). 
In M aerkle  v. B ritish  Continental Fur Co. Ltd., [1954] W.L.R. 
1242, it was held in the English Court of Appeal that there 
may be situations where a declaratory judgment could be 
obtained by a plaintiff who had no status in the accepted 
sense. No suggested situations were advanced. In S.M.T. 
(Eastern) L im ited  et al. v. City o f Saint Joh n  (1945), 18 
M.P.R. 374 (N.B.Ch.D.), an action for a declaratory judg­
ment was dismissed, the plaintiffs right being only one in 
common with the other residents of the City. The Court 
suggested that there must be some special right of the plain ­
tiff’s that required protection.
tion of status is not raised, although apparently it was accepted 
that status existed;130 in other cases the direct concern of the 
plaintiff is clearly visible.131
In Howson v. City of Medicine Hatn2 Walsh J. considered 
the status of a plaintiff in an action for a declaration to quash 
a by-law. He resolved the question in this manner:133
[The Act] expressly confers upon any elector the right 
to apply to quash any by-law or resolution of the coun­
cil for illegality. That is exactly what this action is 
brought for coupled with an additional claim for relief 
based upon and incidental to the alleged illegality. It 
is true that this section^  gives only this right to move 
to quash and does not in terms extend that right to the 
bringing of an action, but it is to my mind a recognition 
of the right of an elector to invoke the aid of the Court 
to undo an illegal act committed by the council.
The report of the decision does not indicate whether the 
action had been commenced before or after the expiration of 
the time limited for the bringing of an application to quash. If 
the time had elapsed, it could not be said that the Act conferred 
any right to quash, that right having expired. Although the ap­
proach is one not lacking in merit, it would appear to be based 
on a misconception of the nature of the summary application. 
The statutory provision was not intended to confer a status to 
attack by-laws by declaratory or other actions on all persons 
satisfying the residency or interest requirements. The right ex­
tended to such persons was for the purpose of maintaining an 
application to quash only.
The general conclusion to be drawn from the cases is that 
a plaintiff seeking a declaratory judgment must have some in-
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130 J .  G. B utterw orth  Co. L im ited  v. City o f O ttawa (1919), 46 
O.L.R. 49 (C.A.); R othsch ild  v. Town o f C ochrane  (1919), 16 
O.W.N. 60 (High Ct.); Re G ordon  and The D eL aval C om ­
pany Ltd., [1938] O.R. 462 (C.A.); Battistutta et al. v. City  
o f Prince G eorge  (1967), 61 D.L.R. (2d) 637 (B.C. Sup. Ct.).
131 A lexan der  v. Tow nship o f H ow ard  (1887), 14 O.R. 22 (High 
Ct.); Bourgon  v. Tow nship o f  C um berland  (1910), 22 O.L.R. 
256 (Div. Ct.); Jou rn a l Printing Co. v. M cVeity  (1914), 33 
O.L.R. 166 (C.A.); G esm an  v. City o f Regina  (1909), 2 Sask. 
L.R. 50 (Sup. Ct.); R e Pane N iagara E nterprises Ltd. and  
City o f N iagara Falls, [1968] 1 O.R. 287 (High Ct.); T onks  v. 
R eid : [1967] S.C.R. 81; T ow ers Marts and P roperties Ltd. v. 
City o f St. C atharines  (1962), 34 D.L.R. (2d) 547 (Ont. High 
Ct.); Town o f  St. L eon ard  v. Fournier  (1956), 3 D.L.R. (2d) 
315 (N.B.C.A.).
132 (1915), 22 D.L.R. 72 (Alta. Sup. Ct.).
133 Ibid., at p. 73.
134 The learned judge was referring to a section analogous to 
s. 277 of the Ontario Municipal Act.
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terest proper to be determined. His position is not significantly 
different from that in any other action.135
Another area where the declaratory power of the court can 
be of great assistance is where a by-law is apparently within the 
proper jurisdiction of the municipality and the only question is 
whether the by-law applies in a given situation.136
Some doubt has arisen in Ontario as to the jurisdiction of 
the court to interpret a municipal by-law on a motion for a 
declaration under the Rules of Court.137 The problem is wheth­
er a by-law is an “instrument” as that term is used in the Rules 
relating to this type of motion. On an application of this nature 
the validity of the ordinance will probably be presumed. The 
court will be concerned only with the interpretation of the en­
actment.
To date no final determination has been made on whether 
a by-law can be interpreted on a motion for a declaration. The 
comments in Re Windsor v. Dapco Ltd.ns and Sun Oil Co. v. 
City of Hamilton139 were obiter. The hcsitancy evident in the 
Ontario Court of Appeal is not so apparent in the lower 
courts.140
The courts should not quibble over the right of a plaintiff 
to maintain a declaratory action for interpretation purposes.
The utility of a declaratory action as a means of determin­
ing the applicability of statutory provisions has long been rec­
ognized. Warrington J. in Burghes v. Attorney-General141 justi­
fies the action in these words:
If the question be not decided in this way it must be
left open until the plaintiff, having refused to comply,
is sued for penalties, and the plaintiff would be left in
135 The question of status is considered in more detail in the 
discussion of ratepayers action under “Representative 
Actions”.
136 In Re W. J .  B la iney  Ltd. and City o f Toronto, [1935] O.R. 
476 (High Ct.), the plaintiff sought a declaration that cer­
tain restrictions in a by-law were not applicable to his 
lands. The Court agreed and granted the requested declar­
atory judgment.
137 Re W indsor & D apco Ltd., [1959] O.W.N. 238 (C.A.); Sun Oil 
Co. v. City o f H am ilton, [1961] O.R. 209 (C.A.).
138 [1959] O.W.N. 238 (C.A.).
139 [1961] O.R. 209 (C.A.).
140 In Re Pane N iagara E nterprises Ltd. and City o f Niagara 
Falls, [1968] 1 O.R. 287 (High Ct.), Keith J. acknowledged 
the doubts expressed in the Court of Appeal, but consid­
ered that a declaratory action was the most convenient 
method.
141 [1911] 2 Ch. 139, at p. 156.
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a position of great perplexity. In my opinion, the mode 
adopted by the plaintiff for obtaining a decision is a 
very convenient one, enabling the Commissioners to be 
informed how far they may go, and relieving the plain­
tiff from the doubt and perplexity into which he has 
been cast.
This principle was emphatically reiterated by Farwell J. in 
Dyson v. Attorney-General142
. . .  it would be a blot on our system of law and proce­
dure if there is no way by which a decision on the true 
limit of the power of inquisition vested in the Commis­
sioners can be obtained by any member of the public 
aggrieved, without putting himself in the invidious posi­
tion of being sued for a penalty.
If a declaration is refused, an interested party must seek 
another method of attack, or await prosecution under the by­
law. The end result is further litigation and expense.
Representative Actions
In the municipal law context a representative action is one 
brought by a named plaintiff in his own right and on behalf, or 
as a representative, of all ratepayers of the municipality.
Early in our municipal history there was no particular dif­
ficulty in permitting a representative action. The council of the 
municipality was considered to be a trustee for the ratepayers. 
Hence any illegal act was a breach of that trust which could be 
enjoined by the cestui que trust.143 However, in Evan v. Cor­
poration of Avon144 it was suggested that there are only two 
types of trusts with which a corporation might be involved, one 
of a private character, and the other of a public or general char­
acter. In the former, an individual could proceed to enforce it, 
whereas in the latter he could not, the matter being one which 
required the intervention of the Attorney-General.
The question of status is of no less significance in a repre­
sentative action than in any other. The basic requirement is 
that stated by Lord Dunedin in Trustees of the Harbour of 
Dundee v. D. /. Nichol:145
142 [1911] 1 K.B. 410 (C.A.), at p. 421.
143 In M ncllreith  v. Hart (1908), 39 S.C.R. 657, at p. 670. Mac- 
lennan J., with whom Fitzpatrick C. J. concurred, said: “The 
right of the inhabitants to compel the city corporation, that 
is the city council, as a body, to do its duty, rests on this: —  
That the corporation is a trustee for the inhabitants.” See 
also B ow es  v. City o f  Toronto (1858), 11 Moore P.C. 463, 14
E.R. 770.
144 (1860), 29 Beav. 144, 54 E.R. 581 (Ch.).
145 [1915] A.C. 550 (H.L.), at p. 562.
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For a person to have such title [to sue] he must be a 
party (using the word in its widest sense) to some legal 
relation which gives him some right which the person 
against wborr. he raises the action either infringes or 
denies.
Assuming that the named plaintiff has no interest sufficient 
to maintain a normal action, does the fact that he purports to 
sue in a representative capacity enhance his position in any 
way? Does adoption of this procedure confer on him the nec­
essary status? Robson J. in Jenkins v. City of Winnipeg146 
considered this question and said:
A private person in his own right and in his own name 
cannot initiate the litigation, nor does the suing on be­
half of all ratepayers assist the matter.1̂
As a matter of principle, it must now be accepted that an 
individual commencing an action to attack a by-law must him­
self have status or title to maintain it.
If a plaintiff can surmount the status problem no valid legal 
obstacle can be advanced to prevent him from suing in a rep­
resentative capacity. It is, however, highly unlikely that there 
will be such unanimity of purpose among all ratepayers as the 
action would appear to convey.148
What interest must a plaintiff have to be considered ade­
quate to permit the maintenance of an action to attack a munic­
ipal by-law? Any municipal ratepayer has an interest in the 
type of government being given by the local authority. It is not 
unreasonable to assume that a ratepayer has an interest in con­
140 [1941] 1 W.W.R. 37 (Man. K.B.), at p. 40.
147 In Cowan  v. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, [1966J 2
O.R. 309, at p. 315, Schroeder J . A., speaking for the Court,
said: “If the plaintiff has no right as an individual to bring
and maintain an action to redress an alleged public wrong,
then his claim as a representative of other individuals,
however numerous, who have no higher rights than he
posses cannot enhance his position.”
148 It was this that caused Meredith J. A. such consternation 
in B eardm ore  v. City o f Toronto  (1910), 21 O.L.R. 505, at 
p. 509: . . but it has long been the subject of very proper 
criticism that the law should allow a single ratepayer of a 
municipality, for ulterior and sinister purposes, to sue in the  
nam e o f all ra tep ay ers . although en tirely  against their w ill 
and desire, to upset any project, however desirable, and 
though unanimously desired by the ratepayers, with the 
single exception of the plaintiff. [Italics in the original.]” 
In G allagher  v. Arm strong  (1911), 3 Alta. L.R. 443 (Sup. 
Ct.), a representative action was taken on behalf of all rate­
payers against the members of council. The members of 
council were, therefore, plaintiffs by representation and 
named defendants. This indicates one of the conflicts in­
herent in this type of action.
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fining his local government within the bounds of its delegated 
authority. In the words of Riley J . :149
One would think, if not governed by authority, that the 
plaintiff has an interest in seeing to it that the defend­
ant passes only valid by-laws . . .
The rules which govern the determination of the question 
of status are those developed in the field of public nuisance.150 
No useful purpose can be achieved by considering whether 
these principles should or should not have been adopted to de­
termine the status of a plaintiff in the type of action here being 
considered.
Kelly C. B. in Winterbottom v. Lord Derby,151 considering 
the right of an individual to require the removal of an obstruc­
tion across a path, said:
. . . the true principle is, that he and he only can main­
tain an action for an obstruction who has sustained some 
damage peculiar to himself, his trade, or calling. A 
mere passer-by cannot do so, nor can a person who 
thinks fit to go and remove the obstruction. To say that 
they could, would really in effect be to say that any of 
the Queen’s subjects could.
In order to entitle a plaintiff to maintain an action, he must 
show a particular damage suffered by all the Queen’s subjects.
In Boyce v. Paddington Borough Council152 Buckley J. in­
dicates two situations where status would be established:
A plaintiff can sue without joining the Attorney-Gen­
eral in two cases: first, where the interference with the 
public right is such as that some private right of his is 
at the same time interferred with . . . and, secondly, 
where no private right is interferred with, but the 
plaintiff, in respect of his public right, suffers special 
damage peculiar to himself from the interference with 
the public right.
The special damage mentioned in the second instance in 
this case has been qualified to some extent in Vanderpant v. 
Mayfair Hotel Company, Limited.153 The damage sustained by
149 Fransden  v. L eth brid g e (City) (1965), 52 W.W.R. 620 (Alta.), 
at p. 624.
150 Me deal f  v. R. S traw bridge, Ltd., [1937] 2 All E.R. 393 (K.B.); 
District o f Oak Bay  v. G ardn er  (1914), 19 B.C.R. 391 (C.A.); 
Code  v. Jon es  and Town o f Perth  (1923), 54 O.L.R. 425 (C.A.); 
One Chestnut P ark  Road Ltd. v. City o f Toronto, L1964j 
S.C.R. 287; Cowan  v. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 
[19661 2 O.R. 309 (C.A.).
151 (1867), L.R. 2 Ex. 316, at p. 322.
152 [1903] 1 Ch. 109, at p. 114.
153 [1930] 1 Ch. 138. The case of Crichton  v. Tow nship o f C ha- 
pleau  (1915), 8 O.W.N. 67 (High Ct.), provides an example 
of an act by a municipality that caused damage peculiar to 
the plaintiff, a motion picture proprietor. The municipality 
was operating a theatre illegally in competition with the 
plaintiff.
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the plaintiff not only must be peculiar to himself, but as well 
should be “direct and substantial”.154
Armour C. J. in Hope v. Hamilton Park Commissioners155 
applied these principles in an action taken to restrain an illegal 
sale by the Hamilton Park Commissioners:
. . .  no one of the public has any right to complain 
whenever parliamentary powers, such as those conferred 
upon this board, have not been strictly followed or are 
intended to be transgressed, unless he can shew that he 
has an interest in preventing the doing of that which 
may well be called a violation of their contract with 
the Legislature. He must not only shew that they are 
committing or intend to commit a wrong, but also that 
the wrong complained of does occasion or will occasion 
loss or damage to him, that he has a special or private 
interest in comining them within the limits of their 
parliamentary powers.
It was suggested in Heffernan v. Town of Walkerton156 and 
llowson  v. City of Medicine Hat157 that, if a plaintiff met the 
qualification required by statue to maintain an application to 
quash, his status in any action would be established. This sug­
gestion has already been commented upon.158
154 The rule was succinctly stated by Judson J. in the Supreme 
Court of Canada in One Chestnut P ark Road Ltd. v. City o f  
Toronto, [1964] S.C.R. 287, at p. 290: “A private individual 
can only maintain an action for a public nuisance if he can 
show some particular and special loss over and above the 
ordinary inconvenience suffered by the public at large. 
Then the nuisance becomes a private one and he can sue in 
tort. The reason lor the rule is to prevent multiplicity of 
actions.” This was not a public nuisance case but rather an 
application by the municipality for an injunction to pre­
vent the violation of a by-law. Therefore, the remarks are 
obiter. An excellent summary of the rule is also given by 
Schroeder J. A. in Cowan  v. Canadian Broadcasting C or­
poration , [1966] 2 O.R. 309. See also the decision of Strong J. 
in Standley  v. P erry  (1879), 3 S.C.R. 356.
155 (1901), 1 O.L.R. 477 (C.A.), at p. 479. The decision has not 
been overruled despite the contrary belief of the Court in 
Livingston  v. City o f Edm onton  (1915), 31 W.L.R. 609 (Alta. 
Sup. Ct.). It has been accepted and adopted in such cases as 
Fransden  v. L eth brid g e (City) (1965), 52 W.W.R. 620 (Alta. 
S.C.); Watson v. M ayor o f H ythe  (1906). 22 Times L.R. 245: 
A ttorney-G eneral v. City o f Toronto (1903), 6 O.L.R. 159 
(High Ct.); Jen k in s  v. City, o f W innipeg , [1941] 1 W.W.R.
37 (Man. K.B.); R ogers v. Trustees o f School District No. 2 
o f Bathurst (1896), 1 N.B. Eq. 266: H ooper  v. City o f North 
V ancouver 0  922), 65 D.L.R. 286 (B.C.C.A.); R obertson  v. 
City o f M ontreal (1915). 52 S.C.R. 30; S.M.T. (Eastern) L im ­
ited  v. City o f Saint Joh n  (1945), 18 M.P.R. 374 (N.B.Ch.D.). 
and on appeal (1946), 19 M.P.R. 103 (N.B.C.A.), K eay  v. City 
o f Regina (1912), 5 Sask. L.R. 372 (Sup. Ct.).
156 (1903), 6 O.L.R. 79 (Street J.).
157 (1915), 22 D.L.R. 72 (Alta. Sup. Ct.).
158 Supra, pp. 28-29.
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In Robertson v. City of Montreal159 the plaintiff, a rate­
payer of the City, in a representative action attacked the validi­
ty of a by-law granting a bus franchise. A contract made as a 
result of the franchise was also questioned. The plaintiff was 
also a shareholder in a competitor of the company obtaining the 
franchise. The principles applied by the majority of the Court 
in dismissing the action were stated by Fitzpatrick C. J . .160
. . . the appellant is not qualified to bring suit. A rate­
payer who has not suffered any special injury, but only 
such as is public in its nature and affects all the in­
habitants alike has no interest entitling him to bring 
action against the city. It is against public policy that 
he should be permitted to do so.
The basis of the public policy referred to in the previous 
statement evidently was that:161
it would be difficult for the public business to be car­
ried on at all if every individual in a city with a pop­
ulation of half a million persons could sit in judgement 
on all the actions of the civic authorities and any crank 
weie at liberty to drag them at anytime before the 
courts. The city would never be free from litigation 
with its attendant expense when, as would probably be 
often the case, the complainants were men of straw.16-
Iddington J. made an impassioned plea for the right to 
maintain the action. He presented what might be considered 
the other side of the public policy coin.163
If the municipal authorities keep within their powers 
Ihey have nothing to fear. If they exceed them the 
sooner it is determined the better.1154
In Dilworth v. Town of Bata165 in the Supreme Court of 
Canada some significant comments were made concerning a
159 (1915). 52 S.C.R. 30. The decision has not received universal 
acceptance. Carrol J. in W arner-Q uinlan A sphalt Co. v. 
City o f M ontreal (1915), 27 D.L.R. 540 (Que.), after review­
ing the case said: “. . . it must be admitted that our juris­
prudence thus far uniform becomes seriously perturbed, 
though not actually done away with”. These remarks were 
prefaced by the statement that prior to this decision actions 
such as that in the R obertson  case could be brought.
160 52 S.C.R., at p. 31.
161 Ibid., at p. 32.
162 A similar view had earlier been expressed in Tanion  v. 
City o f C harlottetow n  (1906), 1 East L.R. 282 (P.E.I. Sup. 
Ct.).
163 52 S.C.R., at p. 55.
164 Harrison C. J . in Re R evell and County o f O xford  (1877),
42 U.C.Q.B. 337, at pp. 347-348, when referring to an illegal 
by-law made a similar suggestion: “. . . the sooner it is out 
of the way the better for all, except those interested in the 
maintenance of imposture.”
165 [19551 S.C.R. 284.
U.N.B. LAW JOURNAL
ratepayer’s right of action. In the judgment of Rand J., with 
whom Kellock and Cartwright J. J. concurred, the following re­
marks appear:166
The right of a ratepayer to bring a municipal corpora­
tion into court as a means of asserting the illegality of 
corporation action affecting its property or civil rights, 
and indirectly the interests of ratepayers, is not chal­
lenged. It assumes that the organ of the corporation 
created to speak and act for all who are comprised with­
in it is disregarding its duty; and the purpose and ef­
fect of the proceeding is to compel the execution of that 
duty. The right of the ratepayer arises from the de­
linquency of the corporation . . .  If the corporation, of 
its ovvn accord, has taken appropriate action, the basis 
of the interposition by a ratepayer, a breach of duty, 
does not arise. It is the primary right and duty of the 
corporation itself to repudiate ultra vires  action and it 
is this right and duty which are brought before the 
Court for enforced action. The right of the ratepayer 
is thus accessory to that of the corporation; the sub­
stantive matter remains in the relation between the 
corporation and the third party.
At first blush these remarks appear to be a radical depar­
ture from the very rigid application of the general rule in the 
Robertson case. There is at least a strong basis for argument 
that the rigidity of the general rule should now be relaxed. An 
examination of the decision indicates quite clearly that the re­
marks are obiter, albeit from a source entitled to great respect.
It is implicit in the remarks that any ratepayer may sum­
mon his municipal corporation before the courts to prevent the 
corporation from pursuing an ultra vires course of conduct. If 
the corporation takes the appropriate action to repudiate its il­
legal act, the basis for any ratepayers action will be removed.
The manner in which these remarks will be applied by the 
courts confronted with this problem is not clearly evident. 
Stark J. considered the decision in Bongard v. Town of Parry 
Sound.167 He appears to have treated it as a reiteration of 
the general and accepted principle.
The probable approach will be to confine the remarks to 
the particular facts of the case. It cannot be overlooked that 
an ultra vires expenditure of money was involved. Although 
the decision appears to offer a very real potential for relaxation 
of the rigid rules surrounding this type of action, there is no 
real justification for optimism. The basic rule is too solidly en­
trenched to be displaced other than by legislation.
166 Ibid., at pp. 288-289.
167 [1968] 2 O.R 137.
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The one exception to the general rule is that accepted in 
Macllreitli v. Harf.168 The expenses of the Mayor of Halifax 
attending a convention had been paid by the City. No legisla­
tion authorized a payment of this nature. An action was com­
menced by a ratepayer for the return of these moneys after the 
council refused to permit the corporate name to be used for 
this purpose. An objection was raised to the status of the plain­
tiff, it being contended that only the Attorney-General could 
bring such an action.
Davies J. accepted the general rule that the action could 
not be maintained unless the plaintiff had sustained some pecu­
liar damage:169
The peculiar damage sustained by the ratepayers as the 
result of such misappropriation, arise out of the in­
creased rates which they will have to pay by reason of 
the misappropriation of the moneys of the corporation.
It matters not whether the damage be great or small, 
unless indeed the whole transaction was so trivial that 
the court would refuse to interfere on that ground . . .
As ratepayers they seem to me to have suffered special 
and peculiar damage to themselves distinct from the 
public damage which the Attorney-General has the sole 
right to represent, and, as a result of such special and 
peculiar damage, have a right to sue in their own 
name . . .
Although the judgment proceeds on the basis of the special 
and peculiar damage sustained by the ratepayer, it is now ac­
cepted that an action in this situation is an exception to the 
general rule.170 It seems evident that the exception will not be 
extended. Duff J., who had concurred in the decision of Davis 
J. in the Macllreitli case, expressed grave doubts in the Robert­
son case about the correctness of that decision.
In the situation in the Macllreitli case, the corporation it­
self would normally be the proper plaintiff. Indeed it has been 
held that the pleadings must allege that the corporation was re­
quested to act and refused.171 Clearly, if the council that auth­
orized the illegal expenditure was still in office, it would have 
been an empty form to request action.172 It has been held that
168 (1908). 39 S.C.R. 657.
169 Ibid., at pp. 663-664.
170 C lu ff v. Cam eron  (1922), 22 O.W.N. 245 (High Ct.); P ater­
son  v. B ow es  (1853), 4 Gr. 170; M cDonald v. Lan caster  
S eparate S chool Trustees  (1914), 31 O.L.R. 360 (High Ct.); 
B lack  v. Ellis (1906), 12 O.L.R. 403 (Div. Ct.); W ilkie  v. 
V illage o f Clinton  (1871), 18 Gr. 557; W allace  v. Town o f  
O rangeville  (1884), 5 O.R. 37 (High Ct.); Corning  v. Town o f  
Y arm outh  (1913), 12 D.L.R. 683 (N.S. Sup. Ct.).
171 B lack  v. Ellis (1906), 12 O.L.R. 403 (Div. Ct.).
172 See P ease  v. Town o f M oosomin  (1901), 5 Terr. L.R. 207 
(Sup. Ct.).
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if the council refuses to take the action requested it should be 
joined as a party defendant.173
In the Macllreith case Davies J. differentiated between the 
interest of the ratepayers and that of the public at large.174 If 
the illegal expenditure had affected all residents of the munici­
pality rather than the ratepayers as a distinctive class, the action 
could not have been maintained.
On the reasoning adopted by Davies J. an argument could 
be made to support an action against a zoning by-law. It could 
be argued that the interest of the property owners and occu­
piers is one which is separate and distinct from the interest of 
the residents generally. But the problem in differentiating be­
tween these respective interests would seem to be insurmount­
able.
Duff J. in Smith v. Attorney-General of Ontario175 recog­
nized that the arguments accepted in the Macllreith case are 
equally applicable to other situations. He pointed out that the 
decision in the Macllreith case did not rest on any clearly de­
fined legal principle, and should not in any event be extended. 
Considering these remarks, the position of a plaintiff attacking 
a zoning by-law will not be enhanced by the decision in the 
Macllreith case.
The right of a ratepayer in the United States to question 
any municipal act which would result in any illegal expenditure 
of money or increase in debt seems to have been accepted by 
the courts with much less difficulty than in Canada.176
A plaintiff who has seen the time limited by s. 280 of the 
Municipal Act expire, and who cannot bring himself within the 
rules outlined previously, has only one remedy. He must elicit 
the support of the Attorney-General, who as the chief law offi­
cer of the Reigning Monarch “files his information to see that 
right is done to his subjects who are incompetent to act for 
themselves”.177
The Attorney-General is under no obligation to act when 
requested to do so. The matter is one entirely within his dis­
173 Eddy  v. Millmine (1920), 52 D.L.R. 312 (Ont. C.A.).
174 In Hooper v. City of North V ancouver (1922), 65 D.L.R. 28C 
(B.C.C.A.), the view was taken that no distinction could be 
drawn between the ratepayers and the public generally  
sufficient on which to found an action.
175 [1924] S.C.R. 331.
176 See Crampton v. Zabriskie (1880), 101 U.S. 601.
177 Davies J . in M acllreith  v. Hart (1908). 39 S.C.R. 657, at p. 
665.
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cretion which is not open to review in any court.178 If he re­
fuses to lend his name to the action, no other avenue or recourse 
is open to the party requesting it. As indicated by Lord Hals- 
bury in London County Council v. Attorney-General,179 his de­
cision may be the subject of political criticism or control, but 
not to judicial scrutiny. Any attempt to circumvent the refusal 
of the Attorney-General to exercise his discretion, such as join­
ing him as a party defendant, will be repelled by the courts.180
Although the court cannot direct the Attorney-General to 
lend his assistance, it has not been adverse to laying down 
ground rules for him to follow:181
It would, in my opinion, have been most improper in 
the Attorney-G eneral to have thrown any impediment 
to prevent the applicant from using his name. I con­
ceive that any opposition on his part to the use of his 
name would have been quite unprecedented, and so, in 
a sense unconstitutional; for a Minister of the Crown 
has no right to exert his influence except according to 
the accustomed methods. W henever any question arises 
in which a civil right or remedy is sought by an in­
dividual . . . against any corporation 0 1* body of men 
. . .  it is the plain duty of the A ttorney-G eneral . . . re ­
ceiving a proper indemnity as to costs —  to act entirely  
without regard to any political or other influences, and 
to leave the doors of the established tribunals entirely 
open and unobstructed —  nay, to remove any real or 
fancied impediments in the approaches to such tribu­
nals. And though there is, of course, no precedent for 
such a case, it is probable that if any Minister should 
so far forget his duty and attem pt to misuse his power, 
then the Court might hold that any individual inhabi­
tant might sue on behalf of himself and all. Otherwise, 
by a combination of purely political or personal grounds, 
e.g. between a Minister and a Municipality, . . . the 
gravest and most enduring infractions of Acts of P arlia­
ment might be placed beyond redress.
The refusal of the Attorney-General to lend his name to 
the proceedings necessarily means the matter cannot be taken 
before the courts. It is clear that the failure to have his con­
sent will not be fatal if it can be obtained after the commence­
178 London County Council v. A ttorney-G eneral, [1902] A.C.
165 (H.L.).
179 [1902] A.C. 165 (H.L.).
180 Grant v. St. Law rence Seaway Authority, 11960] O.R. 298 
(C.A.).
181 Begbie C. J . in A nderson  v. City of Victoria  (1884), 1 B.C.R. 
(Pt. 2) 107, at p. 108. See also A ffleck  et al. v. City of Nelson 
(1957), 10 D.L.R. (2d) 442 (B.C. Sup. Ct.).
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ment of the action.182 All proceedings will be stayed until it is 
filed with the court.183
Iddington J. in Robertson v. City of Montreal184 had little 
faith that the Attorney-General could always be relied on to act 
properly. He preferred to place his trust “upon the vigilance of 
the ratepayers”. Anglin J., in the same case, commented in 
these words:
I should, however, deem it a misfortune it such an action 
as this could not be maintained by a ratepayer. Having 
regard to the many difficulties in the way of securing 
intervention by the A ttom eys-G eneral, a very useful, 
if not in many instances, the only practical safeguard in 
this country against improper exercise of their powers 
by municipal corporations would be taken away.
Assuming the co-operation of the Attorney-General, when 
will his assistance be a prerequisite to the maintenance of any 
action? If the injury occasioned to the plaintiff results in some 
peculiar and special injury to him, he can maintain the action 
in his own right, whereas, if his injury is one common to all 
members of the public, he must obtain the assistance of the 
Attorney-General.
In Evan v. Corporation of Avon1*'* it was suggested that 
anything in the nature of a public trust must be enforced by the
182 Rogers v. Trustees of School District No. 2 of Bathurst 
(1896), 1 N.B. Eq. 266; Robertson  v. Wilson (1915), 31 W.L.R. 
708 (Alta. Sup. Ct.). In S.M .T. (Eastern) Lim ited  v. City of 
Saint John  (1945), 18 M.P.R. 374 (N.B.Ch.D.), on appeal 
(1946), 19 M.P.R. 103 (N.B.C.A.), the action was merely dis­
missed. A new action was taken in the name of the A ttor- 
ney-General. See A ttorney-G eneral of N.B. v. City of Saint 
John  (1948), 22 M.P.R. 389 (N.B.C.A.). In K eay  v. City of 
Regina  (1912), 5 Sask. L.R. 372 (Sup. Ct.), it was stated that 
the amendment could not be granted subject to such ap­
proval being obtained.
183 Jenk ins  v. City of W innipeg. [1941] 1 W.W.R. 37 (Man. 
K .B .); Fransden  v. L ethbridge (City) (1965), 52 W.W.R. 620 
(Alta. Sup. Ct.).
184 (1915), 52 S.C.R. 30, at p. 46.
185 Ibid., at pp. 69-70.
186 (1860), 29 Beav. 144, 54 E.R. 30 (Ch.). This decision has beer, 
generally accepted. See Watson v. Mayor of Hythe (1906).
22 Times L.R. 245; Tanton v. City of Charlottetown (1906), 
1 East L.R. 282 (P.E.I. Sup. C t.); M erritt v. Chesley  (1888), 
N.B. Eq. C. 324; Rogers v. Trustees of School District No. 2 
of Bathurst (1896), 1 N.B. Eq. 266. The Court in Brogdin  v. 
Bank of Upper Canada (1867), 13 Gr. Ch. 544, reviewed the 
Eban  case. Although inclined to follow it, the Court, in view  
of the decision in Patterson v. Bowes (1853), 4 Gr. Ch. 170, 
could not do so. The Evan  case was considered and rejected  
in Shrim pton  v. City of W innipeg (1900), 13 Man. R. 211 
(K .B.).
Attorney-General. The extent of the class interested in that trust 
was not a factor to be considered. In Stockwell v. Southgate 
Corporation187 Porter J. suggested that it was only in those sit­
uations where the whole country was affected that the Attorney- 
General must be a party. These decisions approach the prob­
lem from diverse directions. In the first, no consideration is 
given to the size of the public group involved; and in the second, 
the nature of the mutter attacked is not examined.
In Livingstone v. City of Edmontoivss the Court did not 
consider the Attorney-General a necessary party where the mat­
ter in question w as not of provincial interest, but only of local 
municipal concern.1811 This is consistent with the approach in
the Stocktccll case.
What is the public interest with which the Attorney-Gen­
eral is concerned? Is it the abhorrence occasioned at seeing 
municipal ratepayers subjected to an illegal by-law? The an­
swer to this last question must clearly be no. The Attorney- 
General. as chief law officer within his territorial jurisdiction, 
must uphold that respect of law so essential to the maintenance 
of existing institutions. It is a matter of great public concern 
in any democratic society that agencies exercise delegated au­
thority only w ithin the confines of their limited powers. Any 
continuous violation of those powers must inevitably lead to 
disrespect for the entire governmental system, no matter how 
minute the segment of the public directly affected. It is this 
overriding interest that concerns the Attorney-General.
An action by the Attorney-General, on the relation of a 
ratepayer, serves the same function as an application to quash 
brought by an individual pursuant to s. 277(1) of the Ontario 
Municipal Act. Assuming status, the application to quash is 
brought as of right. No appraisal of the merits of the applica­
tion is made prior to trial. The only restraint imposed on an 
applicant is the security requirement.1
When the’ Attorney-General is requested to lend his name 
to any proceeding, he must determine whether the situation is 
of such importance as to justify his intervention. If a conclu-
liiT [i 36| 2 All E.R. 1343.
188 (1915). 31 W .L.R. 609 (Alta. Sup. Ct.).
*39 The ?ame view was taken in G allagher v. A rm strong  (1911).
• 3 Alta. L.R. 443 (Sup. C t.); District of Oak Bay v. G ardner
19 B.C.R. 391 (the dissenting judgment of McPhillips 
J . A.i; Smith  v. Township o ' Raleigh (1882). 3 O.R. 405 
(High Ct.); S tceres  v. City of Moncton (1914) 42 N.B.R. 465 
(Ch.D); Attorney-G eneral and Spalding Rural District
C.> n.:il v. G arner, 11907] 2 K.B. 480.
190 lv or on applying to quash a by-law  must enter into a 
re o/jni/an e in the amount of $100.00.
40 V.N.B. LAW JOURNAL
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sion favourable to the applicant is reached, the Attorney-Gen­
eral has no further responsibility. The proceedings will be 
styled in his name at the relation of the private individual. The 
individual relator has the sole conduct of the action, and will 
pay or receive costs in accordance with the ultimate determina­
tion made by the court. The interest or status of the relator is 
no longer in issue.191 The position of the relator vis-à-vis the 
municipal respondent is not enhanced through the intervention 
of the Attorney-General; the allegations must still be proved.192
It is submitted that s. 280 of the Ontario Municipal Act, 
which restricts the time for the bringing of an application to 
quash to one year, should be amended. If the applicant alleges 
that the offending by-law is void, as opposed to only voidable, 
he should be entitled to have the merits of his contention de­
termined at any time. If  his application is sustained, the by-law 
should be quashed. This would effectively eliminate the dif­
ficulties inherent in the present situation.
PART 2
GROUNDS FO R ATTACKING BY-LAWS
CHAPTER 4
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
There are several criteria by which the validity of any by­
law may be tested. The fundamental issue initially is getting 
the by-law before a court of competent judisdiction in order 
that it may be examined against one or more of these. A by-law 
may be obviously bad, but there is little, if any, satisfaction in 
this knowledge if an individual does not have the status re­
quired to invoke the aid of the court.
If it is possible to apply to quash the by-law or to bring a 
direct action attacking it, both of which methods have been 
previously discussed,193 then the arguments against the offend­
ing enactment will be heard and determined.
The discretion invoked to dismiss an application to quash 
when the illegality of a by-law is shown by extraneous evidence 
has been discussed.194 There was some attempt to import a
191 A ttorney-G eneral and Spalding Rural District Council v. 
G arner, [1907J 2 K.B. 480.
192 A ttorney-G eneral v. City of Toronto (1903), 6 O.L.R. 159 
(High C t.); London County Council v. A ttorney-G eneral, 
[1902] A.C. 165 (H .L.); A ttorney-G eneral v. Harris, [1961] 
1 Q.B. 74 (C.A.).
193 Supra, cc. 1 and 3 respectively.
194 Supra, c. 1.
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similar discretion into other types of actions where the validity 
of a by-law was in issue. In Rex v. Laforge,195 a prosecution 
of an offence under a by-law, the Court would not concede the 
right to prove the illegality of that by-law by extraneous evi­
dence where such illegality was not apparent on the face of the 
by-law. Fortunately these comments do not appear to have re­
ceived general acceptance. A fundamental consideration when 
a by-law is under attack is that some person’s liberty or proper­
ty is invariably involved. No mere technicality, such as the 
manner in which the illegality of the by-law is established, 
should be permitted to uphold any illegal municipal action.
In Hall v. City of Moose Jaw196 the Court described some 
of the procedures by which by-laws had been attacked:
The validity of a by-law  may be incidentally questioned 
otherwise than by motion to quash, namely, by a motion 
to quash a conviction made thereunder . . .1!,7 or in an  
action of replevin; . . .198 or for a mandam us;1'^ in an  
action for an injunction to restrain the breach of the 
b y - l a w , 200 or to restrain the municipality from taking 
proceedings thereunder . . .201  or a declaration that the 
by-law  is invalid, or incidentally upon the trial of an 
action.
To the proceedings enumerated in this judgment might 
also be added an action for the return of moneys paid under a 
by-law,202 and a review of a conviction by certiorari.203
If the validity of the by-law is in issue on a prosecution of
195 (1906), 12 O.L.R. 308 (Div. Ct.).
196 (1910), 3 Sask. L.R. 22 (Sup. Ct.).
197 The Queen  v. Osier (1872), 32 U.C.Q.B. 324; R ex  v. Van 
Norman  (1909), 19 O.L.R. 447 (High C t.); Re Hickey  (1955), 
111 C.C.C. 373 (B.C. Sup. C t.); R ex v. Laforge  (i906), 12 
O.L.R. 308 (Div. Ct.); Regina  v. Cuthhert (1880), 45 U.C.Q.B. 
19; Upton v. Brown  (1912), 3 W.W.R. 626 (Alta. Dist. Ct.): 
Leo G ee Wing v. A m or  (1909), 10 W .L.R. 383 (B C. Co. Ct.)- 
Regina  v. Bowman  (1898), 6 B.C.R. 271 (Sup. C t.); R ex  v. 
Standard Fuels Ltd. (1943), 81 C.C.C. 61 (Ont. Co. Ct.), on 
appeal (1944), 82 C.C.C. 357 (Ont. C.A.).
198 The Niagara Falls Suspension B ridge Company v. G ardner 
(186D), 29 U.C.Q.B. 194.
199 Re Joy  Oil Co. & Gillies & Toronto (1936), 67 C.C.C. 325 
(Sup. Ct.). On appeal (1937), 68 C.C.C. 57 (Ont. C.A.), the 
Court reserved judgment until a summary application to 
quash could be brought, taking the view that this was too 
important a question to be decided on an indirect applica­
tion.
200 Regina ex  rel. A ndrew s v. L ennox  (1953), 107 C.C.C. 179 
(Ont. C.A.).
201 Sampson  v. City of Kingston, [1941] O.W.N. 248 (High Ct.).
2Ü2 Campbell v. Halvorsen  (1918), 11 Sask. L.R. 58 (Sup. Ct.).
203 R ex  v. Sun Chang (1909), 14 B.C.R. 275 (Sup. Ct. en banc);
Regina  v. Petersky  (1897), 5 B.C.R. 549 (Sup. Ct.).
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a violation under it, the time at which the objection is raised 
may be of importance. Most provinces under their Summary 
Conviction Act provide that, if an appeal is based on an objec­
tion to an information, no judgment shall be given in favour of 
the appellant for any defect therein in substance or form, unless 
that objection was taken at the trial.204
In Upton v. Brown205 the Court permitted an objection to 
the validity of the by-law to be raised, notwithstanding the fact 
that such objections had not been raised before the tribunal of 
first instance. In Regina v. Bowman,206 on the other hand, the 
Court refused to consider such an objection.
In Regina v. Koven207 the New Brunswick Court of Appeal 
held such an objection to be more than one of substance or 
form. Since the by-law was a nullity, the defendant was 
charged with an offence unknown to the law.
Regardless of the possibility of success before the tribunal 
of first instance, the grounds for appeal should be laid at this 
stage. The decision in Regina v. Koven seems to offer the most 
sensible approach to this problem.
Any discussion of attacks on by-laws should also be con­
cerned with the probable results of discovering some illegality. 
Must the entire by-law be struck down, or need the bad parts 
only be eradicated? Some decisions compare a by-law to the 
"curate’s egg”, if bad in part it is bad throughout. This position 
does not acknowledge any right of severance.
The correct method of approaching this question of sever­
ance, it is submitted, was stated by the Supreme Court of the 
United States in Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Company:208
If different sections of a statue are independent of each 
other, that which is unconstitutional may be disregard­
ed. and the vaiid section may stand and be enforced.
But if an obnoxious section is of such import that the 
other sections without it cause results not contemplated 
or desired by the legislature, then the entire statute 
must be held inoperative.
Draper C. J. in In re Michie and City of Toronto209 stated 
the same principle albeit in somewhat more colourful language:
It apoears that the debentures themselves were issued 
in conformity to the statute, not in compliance with this
204 See, for example, the Summary Convictions Act, R.S.N.B. 
1952, c. 220, s. 53, as enacted by S.N.B. 1960, c. 72, s.9.
205 (1912), 3 W.W.R. 626 (Alta. Dist. Ct.).
206 (1898). 6 B.C.R. 271 (Sup. Ct.).
2U7 (1962), 39 D.L.R. (2d) 203.
208 (1901), 184 U.S. 540 (Harlan J.), at p. 565. The Court had 
under discussion the constitutional validity of a statute.
209 (1862), 11 U.C.C.P. 379, at p. 386.
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illegal provision in the by-law. The other portions of 
the by-law  are independent of the fourth section, and 
it would have been, as I think, a legal and effectual 
Dy-lavv if this iourth clause had not been introduced.
We may, I think, lop off this rotten limb, and leave the 
tree to which it \vas attached in full vitality. It is un­
necessary to its existence, and to its bearing the fruit it 
was intended to produce . . . the defect is confined to 
the fourth section, and does not vitiate the rest . . .
Before any portion of a by-law can be severed, it must be 
determined if the invalid portion is an integral part of the 
whole. If such be the case, the entire enactment must fall.210 
This principle was applied by Kerwin J. in Long Branch v. 
Hogle.2n The Court was there concerned with a by-law to re­
strict an area to residential uses. The penalty provision was 
contrary to the enabling legislation:212
As Middleton J . A. stated in Morrison v. Kingston,
[1937] 4 D.L.R 740 (O nt.), at p. 745, a part of a by-law  
found invalid must be clearly severable in order to up­
hold the rem ainder but that condition exists here where 
the only part found invalid is the additional penalty 
imposed by the second sentence of para. 2 of the bylaw.
That additional penalty is not so bound up with the pro­
vision in para. 1 as to form part of the scheme adopted 
Dy the council of the municipality.
If the substantial portion of the by-law is illegal, it will be 
struck down on principle.213 The decisions do not give any
210 A practical application of this rule can be seen in Re Taylor 
and Town of Port Stanley  (1918), 14 O.W.N. 108 (High Ct.); 
Re Hay and Town oj Listowel (1897), 28 O.R. 332 (High Ct.); 
R ex  v. M clUree, [1950] 2 W.W.R. 1100 (B.C.C.A.); Re Mc­
Cormack and Township of Toronto, [1948] O.W.N. 425 (High 
Ct.); The K ing  v. Morris (1922), 56 N.S.R. 1 (Sup. Ct. in 
bance); The K ing ex  rel. Best v. Veinot (1939), 14 M.P.R. 27 
(N.S. Sup. Ct. in banco); In re Clay and City of Victoria 
(1886), 1 B.C.R. (Pt. 2) 300 (Sup. Ct.);J?ex v. Labovitch  (1933).
41 Man R. 393 (K .B .); In re  Clark and Township of Howard 
(1885), 9 O.R. 576 (High C t.); Riches v. Richmond Township, 
[1933] 3 D.L.R. 437 (B.C.C.A.); The K ing  v. Penner, [1930] 
1 D.L.R. 834 (Man. C.A.); Regina  v. Russell (1883), 1 B.C.R.
256 (Sup. C t.); Strickland  v. Hayes, [1896] 1 Q.B. 290; 
Robert Hudson Construction Co. Ltd. v. Town of Acton, 
r 19581 O.W.N. 165 (High Ct.); Re M usty’s Service Stations 
Ltd. & Ottawa, [1959] O.R. 342 (C.A.); R ex  v. VanNorman  
(1909), 19 O.L.R. 447 (High Ct.); V erein  Teutonia in W ind­
sor v. Township of Sandwich West (1961). 28 D.L.R. (2d) 
706 (Ont. C.A.): R ex  v. Sm eed ’s Security Storage Limited, 
[1941] 2 W.W.R. 197 (Sask. C.A.); Re H arper and City of 
St. Thomas, [1939] O.R. 525 (High Ct.); B ridge  v. The Queen, 
[1953] 1 S.C.R. 8.
211 (1948), 92 C.C.C. 147 (Can.).
212 Ibid., at p. 150.
213 Town of St. Leonard  v. Fournier  (1956), 3 D.L.R. (2d) 31c> 
(N.B.C.A.); Re T. W. Hand Firew orks Co. Ltd. and City of 
P eterborough  (1962), 34 D.L.R. (2d) 102 (Ont. High Ct.).
U.N.B. LAW JOURNAL 45
clear indication as to whether the reference to the word “sub­
stantial” necessitates a qualitative or quantitative analysis of 
the illegal portion vis-à-vis the whole. If the by-law would be 
in such truncated form, after removing the illegal portion, that 
it would not have been passed by council in that form, it must 
be held bad in its entirety.214
In City of Chatham v. The Sisters of St. Joseph,215 Robert­
son C. J. considered the problem of severing an illegal portion 
of a zoning by-law:
These by-law s for imposing building restrictions usually 
set up a scheme which is designed and adopted as a 
whole and . . .  it is from the very nature of the by-law  
a delicate operation for the Court to sever one part of 
such a by-law  from the rest with any assurance that 
what is left of it sets forth any scheme that the council 
had put in operation.
In this case the Court had serious reservations concerning 
the ability of the Court to quash only a portion of a zoning by­
law. Such by-laws in Ontario require the approval of the 
Municipal Board. To quash any provision of such a by-law 
would be tantamount to amending it without the approval of 
the Board. This question was raised in Long Branch v. 
Hogle,216 but the Supreme Court of Canada avoided any con­
clusive determination. The issue was the validity of a provision 
for which there was no requirement of Municipal Board ap­
proval. Even assuming the efficacy of the argument against 
severability, the provision could be removed without affecting 
the entire validity of the by-law. However, it is doubtful if this 
argument will be upheld when a direct decision becomes es­
sential.
If in any scheme set up under a zoning by-law some il­
legality is discovered in a portion of the by-law, the entire by­
law should not, and probably will not, be struck down. This is 
particuarlv true if the provisions relating to any one district are 
complete or virtually so.
Bearing these considerations in mind, the criteria against 
which by-laws are tested will be examined. The applicability 
and the desirability of applying these criteria to zoning by-laws 
will be examined. It will be presumed in this discussion that 
the applicant or plaintiff has the required status to maintain the 
action.
214 Nelson v. City of London, [1944] O.W.N. 455 (High Ct.); 
Re B unce and Town of Coburg, [1963] 2 O.R. 343 (C.A.): 
Regina ex  rel. Courneyea  v. Pawych (1960), 25 D.L.R. (2d)
222 (Ont. High Ct.).
215 [1940] O.W.N. 548 (C.A.), at p. 554. A similar view was e x ­
pressed in Carrick  v. Corporation of Point Gray, [1927] 2 
W.W.R. 684 (B.C.C.A.).
216 (1948), 92 C.C.C. 147.
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CHAPTER 5
ULTRA V IRES
When examining various judical pronouncements on mu­
nicipal by-laws, it is apparent that the basis on which such en­
actments may be struck down are many and varied. They in­
clude bad faith, uncertainty, discrimination, delegation and 
ultra vires.217 There appears to have developed a view in the 
cases that these grounds are individual and distinct. The fact 
of the matter is that the only legitimate basis for declaring a 
by-law invalid is excess of jurisdiction.
The fundamental question is whether the by-law is or is 
not ultra vires. The answer to this question may in fact involve 
difficult questions of interpreting the enabling legislation or the 
by-law purposely enacted under it. The ordinary rules of 
statutory construction are utilized,218 but in addition certain 
ground rules have been developed by the courts in considering 
the validity of by-laws. In each case the by-law will be declared 
ultra vires because of a violation of certain of these rules. 
Essentially the courts are declaring the intention of the legisla­
ture which granted the powers to the municipality. For ex­
ample, it is assumed that the legislature would not intend dele­
gated authority to be exercised in a discriminatory fashion in 
the absence of express language to the contrary. It is the extent 
of the jurisdiction delegated to the municipal council that must 
be determined in each case. The only legitimate reason for 
striking down a by-law is because the action of the council is 
ultra vires.219
For discussion purposes, the grounds on which a by-law 
may be attacked will be considered as separate and distinct. 
Ultra vires will, therefore, be considered in its most elementary 
form, that is, non-compliance with the enabling legislation. The
217 The various grounds of attack are set out and briefly dis­
cussed in Re Howard and City of Toronto (1927), 61 O.L.R. 
563 (C.A.).
218 For a discussion of these rules, reference may be had to 
Craies, On Statute Law, (6th ed., 1963), and Maxwell, On the 
Interpretation of Statutes, (12th ed., 1969).
219 This is supported by W arrington L. J . in Short v. Poole 
Corporation, [1926] Ch. 66, at p. 91. “My view then is th af 
the only case in which the Court can interfere with an act 
of a public body which is, on the face of it, regular and 
within its powers, is when it is proved to be in fact ultra 
vires, and that the references in the judgments to bad faith, 
corruption, alien and irrelevant motives, collateral and in­
direct objects, and so forth, are merely intended when prop­
erly understood as examples of m atters which if proved to 
exist might establish the ultra vires character of the act in 
question.”
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general powers of a municipality under the “peace, order and 
good government” clause of the Ontario Municipal Act220 will 
also be examined.
The municipality is not a free agent within its territorial 
jurisdiction, but must confine its activities strictly within the 
provisions of the enabling legislation.221 As stated by Spence J. 
in Regirui v. Jeffs :222
Manifestly there must be some limitation on this power 
of self-governm ent; otherwise the results would be 
chaos. The first and most obvious limitation is found 
in the limitation imposed upon the power of the prov­
ince itself by the British North Am erica Act. The prov­
ince has not itself universal power of legislation, and 
its creature, the municipality, can have no higher pow­
er. A second, and for many purposes of limitation of 
equal importance, is that where the Provincial Legisla­
ture has itself undertaken to deal with a certain subject 
m atter in the interest of the inhabitants of the province, 
all legislation by the municipality must be subject to 
the provincial enactment. A third limitation is, I think, 
to be found in the express enactment of the Municipal 
Act.
The legislative capacity of the province must be one of the 
factors to be considered when the validity of a by-law is under 
attack. This can arise either where a provincial statute confers 
specific judisdiction on the municipality or where the munici­
pality purports to act under a general power to enact by-laws 
for the health, safety, morality and welfare of the inhabitants of 
the municipality.223 In the first instance then it is the provin­
cial statute that must be subjected to scrutiny; in the second it 
is the by-law.224
Let us assume that the enabling legislation clearly purports 
to authorize the enactment of a particular by-law. The by-law 
will be invalid if the enabling statute is invalid. One approach 
that may be used to determine the constitutional validity of the
220 See also Municipalities Act, S.N.B., 1966, c. 20, s. 7 and 1st 
Schedule.
221 Canadian Freightw ays Ltd. v. City of Calgary  (1967), 61 
D.L.R. (2d) 253 (Alta. Sup. Ct.).
222 (1959), 30 C.R. 24, (Ont.), at pp. 28-29. See also the judgment 
of Middleton J . A. in Re Morrison and City of Kingston,
[1938] O.R. 21 (C.A.); Regina  v. Tkachuk  (1960), 35 C.R. 293 
(Sask. Magis. Ct.).
223 See, for example, the Ontario Municipal Act, s. 243.
224 In many cases the by-law  will be attacked both on the 
ground that the province has no authority to delegate the 
legislative power under which the by-law  is enacted, and 
alternatively that the by-law  is bad in any event. This was 
the approach taken in City of Montreal v. Beauvais (1909),
42 S.C.R. 211.
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statute is to examine its “pith and substance”. The object of 
this approach is to determine the evil or problem to which the 
statute is directed.
If the statute is designed for “the promotion of public or­
der, safety or morals”, it will be presumed as one which prima 
facie invades the field of criminal law and not concerned with 
a legislative objective within the fields allocated to the province 
by the British North America Act.225 The fact that the statute 
is concerned with these matters does not necessarily conclude 
the question; it is quite possible that provincial statutes which 
in fact promote “public order, safety or morals” may have suf­
ficient relation to provincial objects as to be sustainable. If, in­
cidental to the attainment of a statute’s principal objective, a 
sanction is imposed, this is not enough to invalidate it.220
It is also quite conceivable that a provincial enabling statute 
is constitutionally valid, but a by-law enacted thereunder is void 
as being in substance an invasion of the federal legislative 
domain.-27
The case of McKay v. The Queen228 is of interest in con­
sidering these questions. The appellant was charged with a vio­
lation of a by-law relating to signs in that he had placed an 
election sign on his property contrary to the by-law. The en­
abling legislation conferred authority on municipal governments 
to regulate and prohibit the posting of signs. The Court dis­
missed the information, holding that on a proper interpretation 
of the by-law it had no application to this case.
The point is that in this instance the enabling legislation 
was general. If the Court had held the by-law was authorized
225 Regina v. K eefe  0 8 90 ), 1 Terr. L.R. 280 (Sup. C t.); Regina 
v. Shaw  (1891), 7 Man. R. 518 (K .B. en banc). Criminal 
power is vested in the federal government under s. 91v27) 
of the British North Am erica Act, whereas the province 
under s. 92(13) has jurisdiction over “property and civil 
rights”.
226 For a consideration of other rules of constitutional inter­
pretation see LaForest, G. V., Disallowance and Reservation 
of Provincial Legislation, (1955); Laskin, Bora, Canadian 
Constitutional Law, (rev. 3rd ed., 1969).
227 As siated in Regina ex  rel. Barrie  v. Stelzer (1957), 15 D.L.R. 
(2d) 280 (Man. C.A.), at p. 287: “The real and only pur­
pose . . .  [of the by-law  provision] is to prevent children 
from having the easy access to cigarettes . . . This is a 
praiseworthy motive but it is . . .  an ‘attem pt to improve 
on an Act of Parliam ent’ . . .  It may be that the provisions 
oi that Act are inadequate to supress the evil of tobacco- 
using by children but it is not within the competence of 
provincial or municipal authorities to ‘put teeth’ into the 
criminal law .”
228 [1965] S.C.R. 798. See also Re Millard and Borough of 
Etobicoke. [1968] 1 O.R. 56 {High Ct.).
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by it, the enabling legislation as well would be invalid. Follow­
ing the well-known principle, the Court interpreted the enabl­
ing legislation as authorizing only the enactment of by-laws 
within the province’s constitutional capacity.
A municipal government, like an ordinary citizen, is bound 
by the general law of the province in which it is located.229 It 
is accepted that local governments can pass by-laws which are 
supplementary, but not contrary, to the general law.230 The 
general law in this sense would include — (1) federal legislative 
preserves, whether utilized or not, (2) provincial statutes, and 
(3) the common law.
Even where the municipality has been given express pow­
er to enact by-laws dealing with a specified subject, if the prov­
ince at some later time enacts comprehensive legislation dealing 
with the same subject matter, the powers of the municipality will 
be deemed to have been revoked.231
The principle on which this is based is one dating back to 
antiquity. It is assumed that the legislature could not be of two 
minds at the same time. If a later statute is repugnant to a 
former, the legislature must be taken as having changed its 
mind and the later statute will govern.232 This principle is 
equally applicable to municipal enactments. However, revoca­
tion by implication is never to be presumed. In fact the proper 
presumption is to the contrary.233 Before such revocation will 
be implied, the two statutes must be judicially determined to 
be incapable of standing together.234 If the two statutes are, in 
pith and substance, concerned with two different situations, 
both will stand.235
229 In Re Broclie and Town of Bowmanville (1876), 38 U.C.Q.B. 
580.
230 See, for example, Thomas v. Sutters, [1900] 1 Ch. 10 (C .A .)1 
White v. M orley. [18991 2 Q.B. 34; Regina ex  rei. Neale v. 
Nendick  (1958), 14 D.L.R. (2d) 39 (B.C. Sup. Ct.).
231 Regina  v. Je ffs  (1959), 30 C.R. 24 (Ont. Cup. Ct.).
232 Bourgon  v. Town of C um berland  (1910), 22 O.L.R. 256 (Div. 
C t.); Re Pane Niagara Enterprises Ltd. and City of Niagara 
Falls, [1968] 1 O.R. 287 (High Ct.).
233 Grand T runk Railway Co. of Caiiada v. Robertson  (1907), 
39 S.C.R. 506; Goldsmith v. City of Indianapolis (1935), 196 
N.E. 525 (Ind. Sup. C t.); B arker  v. E dger, [1898] A.C. 748 
(P.C.).
234 Regina  v. Canada Safew ay Lim ited  (1955), 16 W.W.R. 331 
(Alta. C.A.); Way v. City of St. Thomas (1906), 12 O.L.R. 240 
(Div. Ct.); Regina  v. Haigh and Haigh (1953), 107 C.C.C. 294 
(B.C. Co. Ct.).
235 Regina v. K essler (1961), 38 W.W.R. 655 (B.C. Magis. Ct.).
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A practical application of this principle is shown by the re­
marks of Bird J. A. In re Vancouver Incorporation A ci:236
. . . the intent of the Legislature, as expressed in section
7 of the Milk Act, is to prescribe in positive and affirm ­
ative terms standards of fitness of milk for human con­
sumption, applicable throughout the Province . . . As­
suming that the sections of the city Act relied upon do 
give powei to . . . forbid the sale of raw  . . . milk . . .
I Ihink that those powers are repugnant to and incon­
sistent with the provisions of the Milk Act. In those 
circumstances, in my opinion, the Milk Act must be 
taken to have repealed by implication such powers, if 
any, as the council may have had under the city Act to 
legislate in respect of pasteurization of milk.
The most elementary example of an ultra vires by-law is 
where the council is empowered to do A and in fact does B. 
There is no doubt of the result in such a situation; the by-law 
must be struck down. This is what, on an application to quash, 
is known as a defeat apparent on the face of the by-law,237 an 
area in which no discretionary power to refuse the application 
is admitted. No useful purpose can be achieved by entering 
into a prolonged and belabored review of the many cases deal­
ing with this elementary situation.238
The enabling legislation may be drawn in such fashion that 
it is difficult, if not impossible, to draft and enact by-laws which 
can effectively implement the powers conferred. Such difficul­
ty will not exhonerate the municipality from strict compliance.239
236 (1945), 62 B.C.R. 114 (C.A.), at pp. 127-128. See also the dis­
senting judgment of O’Halloran J . A. in R ex  v. Woods
(1939), 73 C.C.C. 386 (B.C.).
2?7 A ttorney-G eneral v. Cam pbell (1872), 19 Gr. Ch. 299.
238 Examples of this situation are found in such cases as R ex  
v. Storie. [ 1930] 3 W.W.R. 366 (Alta. C.A.); Ross v. The 
Queen, [1955] S.C.R. 430; Regina  v. On Hing (1834), 1 B.C.R. 
(Pt. 2) 148 (Sup. C t.); City of Halifax  v. Clusen  (1886), 18 
N.S.R. 521 (Sup. Ct. in banco); Craig v. Town of Qu’appelle
(1917), 10 Sask L.R. 307 (Sup. Ct. en banc); Regina v. Smith  
(1899). 31 O.R. 224 (Div. C t.); Re Howard and Village of 
Swansea, [1947] O.W.N. 715 (C .A.); W iener and A nderson  
v. County of Elgin, [1947] O.W.N. 360 (High C t.); City of 
Toronto v. Elios Rogers Co. (1914), 31 O.L.R. 167 (C.A.), 
Rex v. Doll (1907), 6 W .L.R. 512 (Terr. Sup. C t.); R ex e r  
rel. Thompson v. Russelle (1951), 100 C.C.C. 175 (Ont. C.A.); 
R ex  v. W akelcy  (1943), 80 C.C.C. 368 (B.C. Co. Ct.); Re 
Kowal and Township of Nelson, [1953] O.W.N. 463 (High 
Ct.); Regiva ex  rel. Dixon  v. K napm an, [1953] O.W.N. 541 
(C.A.); Re Chappus and Town of La Salle (1928), 62 O.L.R. 
140 (High C t.); Re M cLeod and Town of K incardine (1876), 
36 U.C.Q.B. 617; Re Cardwell and Graham and Township of 
Asphodel, [1953] O.W.N. 967 (High Ct.).
239 Regina  v. Horback  (1967), 64 D.L.R. (2d  ̂ 17 (B.C. Sup. Ct.).
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A municipal ordinance may be held ultra vires even where 
there is express power to enact a by-law encompassing the same 
subject matter. If, for example, a by-law recites the basis for 
its authority, the validity of that by-law must be determined on 
the court’s interpretation as to whether the statutory provision 
recited does in fact confer the authority alleged. If the provi­
sion referred to in the by-law does not confer the authority, the 
by-law will be ultra vires. It is not permissible to rely on any 
other provision which expressly confers such authority.240 From 
the standpoint of the municipality it would be desirable never 
to refer to the statutory power under which the by-law is en­
acted. This is particularly so in view of the principle enunciated 
by Rose J. in Re Croome and City of Brantford:241
. . . the law is well settled that if the by-law  states no 
particular power as its basis, it will be judicially re ­
garded as emanating from that power which would have 
warranted its passage.
A municipality cannot enact a by-law under an express 
statutory provision with the sole purpose of carrying out some 
ulterior objective. Attempts have been made by imposing 
peculiar regulations dealing with the construction and place­
ment of service station buildings to restrict the area in which 
they could be established. The courts took the position that this 
was really an attempt to regulate and control the use of land. 
The municipality was really endeavouring to avoid the more 
rigid controls required for the implementation of zoning by­
laws. Since the restrictions were not enacted for the purpose 
intended by the legislature under the relevant provision they 
were illegal.242
A traditional approach of municipal governments when 
confronted with the task of defending doubtful by-laws has 
been to depend on the “peace, order and good government” 
clause. S. 243 of the Ontario Municipal Act provides:
Every council may pass such by-law s and make such 
regulations for the health, safety, morality and welfare
oi the inhabitants of the municipality in m atters not 
specifically provided for by this Act as may be deemed 
expedient and are not contrary to law . . .
Middleton J. A. in Re Morrison and City of Kingston,213 
after setting out some of the restrictions on municipal powers,
240 Melton v. City of Calgary  (1953), 10 W.W.R. (N.S.) 428 
(Aita. Dist. C t.); Regina  v. Reed  (1886), 11 O.R. 242 (High 
Ct.). But see Applewood Dixie Ltd. v. Town of Mississauga, 
[1969] 2 O.R. 467 (C.A.).
241 (1884), 6 O.R. 188 (High Ct.), at p. 193.
242 Re Cities Service Oil Co. Ltd. and City of Kingston  (1956), 3
D.L.R. (2d) 126 (Ont. High Ct.).
243 [1938] O.R. 21, at p. 26.
dealt with the section of the then Municipal Act analogous to 
the present s. 243:
Very few subjects falling within the ambit of local gov­
ernment are left to the general provisions of s. 259 . . . 
These express powers are, I think, taken out of . . . 
s. 259 . . . m atters of ‘health’ are generally regulated by 
The Public Health Act, . . . m atters of ‘safety’ are cov­
ered by a multitude of Acts . . . m atters of ‘m orality’ 
are generally dealt with by the Parliam ent of the 
Dominion . . . These topics are entirely removed from  
the sphere of legislation of municipal councils. The 
power to legislate for the ‘w elfare’ of the inhabitants 
is too vague and general to admit of definition. It may  
mean so much that it probably does mean very little.
Tt cannot include powers that are otherwise specifically 
given, nor can it be taken to confer unlimited and un­
restrained power with regard to m atters in which a con­
ditional power only is conferred upon the subsidiary 
legislature.
It is apparent, not only from the Morrison case, but from 
ihe authorities generally, that very little latitude will be ac­
corded to municipal governments under the “peace, order and 
good government” clause.244 If some specific authority or grant 
of power is not conferred, a council would have great difficulty 
in justifying its by-law under the general clause. It would seem 
that no by-law dealing with a subject not included with the 
scope of municipal concern, no matter how advantageous or de­
sirable it may be, will be supported.245 The courts are not in­
clined to extend municipal powers by implication. 246 Addition­
al powers will not be implied unless it is clear beyond question 
that the legislature intended such powers to be given.
In New Brunswick municipalities are usually given author­
ity to pass by-laws for the “peace, order and good government” 
of the municipality. Certain specific powers are then enumer­
ated with the provision that these are not to restrict the gener­
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244 Regina ex rel. Collins v. Pugliese (1953), 107 C.C.C. 38 (Ont. 
Magis. C t.); Hayes v. Thompson (1902), 9 B.C.R. 249 (Sup. 
C t.); Tavener v. Port Stanley, [1945] 4 D.L.R. 710 (Ont. C.A.); 
Re City of Berlin and County Judge of County of Waterloo 
(1914), 33 O.L.R. 73 (High C t.); Rex  v. Kite (1949), 8 C.R. 278 
(B.C. Co. C t.); Re Goudie and City of Kitchener (1922), 22 
O.W.N. 380 (High C t.); Re Davies v. Municipality of Clifton 
(1859), 8 U.C.C.P. 236; Rex v. Mustin (1940), 74 C.C.C. 364 
(Ont. Sup. Ct.). On the question of health, the decisions 
from the lowest to the highest Court are interesting in the 
case of Village of Forest Hill v. Metropolitan Toronto, [1955] 
O.R. 889 (High Ct.), [1956] O.R. 367 (C.A.), (1957), 9 D.L.R. 
(2d) 113 (Can. Sup. Ct.).
245 Cornwall v. Township of West Nissouri (1875), 25 U.C.C.P. 9.
246 McLcan and Toivn of Cornwall (1871), 31 U.C.Q.B. 314.
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ality of the general power.247 This type of provision, at least 
prima facie, would seem to be much broader in scope than the 
Ontario provision. There does not appear to be any specific 
decision in New Brunswick in which this clause has been dealt 
with so the matter is still one of some speculation.
The specific powers in the New Brunswick provision are 
deemed to be included within the “peace, order and good gov­
ernment” provision, but do not restrict or qualify those general 
powers. Can the special powers given under such a provision 
be supplemented by the general clause, so as to extend the au­
thority specifically given?
An attempt was made to justify this approach by the City 
of Montreal in Vic Restaurant Inc. v. City of Montreal,248 The 
only restriction placed on the general powers of the City was 
the requirement that its by-laws be subject to the Charter and 
subordinate to the general laws of the province and country. 
The section expressly provided that the general powers were to 
be in addition and supplementary to the specific powers grant­
ed. Locke J. rebuffed the City’s attempt to relv on the “peace, 
order and good government” clause. He held that, since the 
power under which the City purported to act was specifically 
granted, the general provision could not be relied on to supple­
ment those specified powers.249
Despite the generality of the “peace, order and good gov­
ernment” clause, it will not be construed as supplementing the 
specific powers enumerated, and cannot be used to bolster a 
doubtful enactment. It seems equally certain that a New Bruns­
wick court charged with interpreting the more general “peace, 
order and good government” provision will adopt the same con­
fining approach as its Ontario counterpart. The section will not 
be construed as conferring unlimited powers, but, on the con­
trary, its application will be restricted so that what the munici­
pality will be permitted to do, and what it appears from the 
statute to be able to do, will be two totally dissimilar things.
For the advocates of local autonomy the interpretation 
which has developed concerning the “peace, order and good 
government” clause is a most undesirable one. From a realistic 
point of view the approach is meritorious. Municipalities, at
247 See, for example, Municipalities Act, S.N.B. 1966, c. 20, s. 7 
and 1st Schedule. This is not something peculiar to New 
Brunswick. An examination of various statutes and city  
charters would disclose many similar approaches throughout 
the country.
248 (1958), 17 D.L.R. (2d) 81 (Can. Sup. Ct.).
249 See also Regina ex  rel. Cox  v. Thompson  (1957), 9 D.L.R. 
(2d) 107 (Ont. C.A.); Regina  v. A nderson  (1958), 27 C.R. 237 
(Alta. Dist. Ct.).
least in thinly populated rural areas, do not have ready access 
to the advice so essential to implementation of a comprehensive 
legislative program which will not only be effective, but also- 
contain the necessary safeguards for the protection of the in­
habitants. It is not politically feasible for the province to grant 
unlimited autonomy to the large municipal agglomerations 
which now exist. The intendant result could be a political en­
tity rivaling the province itself in authority and autonomy.
Ultra vires zoning by-laws will be treated no differently 
than other such municipal enactments.
CHAPTER 6
NON-COMPLIANCE BY COUNCIL 
W ITH  INTERNAL PROCEDURE
It is usual for most municipalities to have a procedural by­
law. These usually relate to a variety of matters — from the 
manner of handling petitions250 to the procedure which must be 
followed in enacting by-laws. Frequently there is a provision 
that no by-law can be given all three readings at any one meet­
ing.251 This is to enable sober second thoughts on an intended 
course of legislative action. This type of provision can usually 
be waived by the unanimous consent of the members of the 
council.
What is the effect of a failure to comply substantially, or at 
all, with the procedural by-law?
Before considering this question, it is perhaps desirable to 
consider the nature of a by-law, that is, what is its effect when 
passed. Coady J. in Mclsaac v. British Columbia Electric Co. 
Ltd.252 states:
A by-law  of the municipality is a statute just as much
as any statute by the provincial Legislature or of the
Parliam ent of Canada, providing it is within the statu-
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250 Under some provisions a petition may be required as a pre­
requisite to council having jurisdiction to pass a particular 
by-law. The procedural by-law  may deal with the manner 
in which the signatures are to be verified, among other 
things.
251 In New Brunswick this is a statutory requirement. See S.N.B. 
1966, c. 20 s. 13(2).
252 [1951] 1 D.L.K. 523 (B.C. Sup. Ct.), at p. 525. See also Grand  
Junction Railway Co. v. County of Peterborough  (1882), 8 
S.C.R. 76 (judgment of Gwynne J .) ;  Speakm an  v. City of 
Calgary  (1908), 1 Alta. L.R. 454 (Sup. Ct. en banc); R ex  v. 
Calbic (1920). 61 D.L.R. 203 (B.C.C.A.); City of Victoria v . 
M eston (1905), 11 B.C.R. 341 (Sup. Ct. en banc); Regina  v. 
City of East Kildonan, E x  parte Towns (1965), 50 D.L.R. (2d> 
381 (Man. Q .6.).
tory  authority granted to the municipality. Within the 
power granted, the municipalities have complete juris­
diction to legislate with respect to all m atters within 
the ambit of the empowering legislation. The legisla­
tive enactments of a municipality are commonly referred  
to as ‘by-law s’ but it m atters not by what name the 
legislation is described. Once the by-law  is passed it 
is as much legislation in force as any other statute law.
It is elementary that a proper by-law, enacted with all due 
solemnity, is effective for the purposes for which it was in­
tended and will be enforced by the courts, the same as any 
other legislation. Bearing in mind the effect of a by-law, what 
has been the approach by the courts where a procedural by-law 
has been disregarded?
In cases such as Re Wilson and Town of Ingersoll,253 In re 
By-law No. 8078 of the City of W innipeg,254 and Reaman v. 
W innipeg255 the Courts held that a failure to comply with the 
procedural by-law was a proper objection and, when properly 
attacked, the by-law so enacted should be struck down.
Notwithstanding the merits of these decisions, they must 
now be taken as being at variance with the weight of judicial 
opinion,256 and must be considered as overruled. The general 
principle is that no departure from any procedural by-law will 
be fatal.257 If the procedure is laid down by statute, the situa­
tion is different. In that situation a failure to comply will re­
sult in the courts striking down any by-law so passed.258
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253 (1894), 25 O.R. 439 (High Ct.).
254 (1914), 6 W.W.R. 576 (Man. K .B.).
255 (1914). 17 D.L.R. 582 (Man. K .B.).
256 Re Howard and City of Toronto (1928), 61 O.L.R. 563 (C.A.); 
City of Toronto v. Phillips (1931), 40 O.W.N. 492 (High Ct.); 
Rannard Shoe Limited v. City of Winnipeg, [1937] 1 W.W.R. 
539 (C.A.); Re Caldwell and Town of Galt (1905), 10 O.L.R. 
618 (High C t.); Re Kelly and Town of Toronto Junction 
(1904), 8 O.L.R. 162 (High Ct.); Re Jones and City of London 
(1899), 30 O.R. 583 (High C t.); Wilson v. Town of Ingersoll 
(1916), 38 O.L.R. 260 (High C t.); Re Brew er and City of 
Toronto (1909), 19 O.L.R. 411 (C.A.); Village of Merritton v. 
County of Lincoln (1917), 41 O.L.R. 6 (C.A.); Re Maycock 
and City of Winnipeg (1914), 24 Man. R. 646 (K .B.); Re A r­
mour and Township of Onondaga (1907), 14 O.L.R. 606 (High 
C t); Shilleto Drug Company v. Town of Hanna, [1931] 3 
W.W.R. 108 (Alta. Sup. Ct.); Re Cameron and City of Vic­
toria (1905), 2 W.L.R. 387 (B.C. Sup. St. en banc); Lougheed 
v. District of Surrey  (1957), 22 W.W.R. 504 (B.C.C.A.).
257 In Wiswell v. Metropolitan Corporation of Greater Winni­
peg, [1965] S.C.R. 512, there was a violation of the proce­
dural by-law relating to the posting of notices. The Court 
found the by-law  bad for other reasons.
258 Re Rural Municipality of Macdonald (1894), 10 Man. R. 294 
(Q .B.); boiley  v. La Corporation de St.-Henri de Taillon 
(1920), 61 S.C.R. 40; In Re Local Option By-law of Rural 
Municipality of Rosedale (1948), 56 Man. R. 108 (K .B.).
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The reason the courts have not insisted on strict compliance 
with a procedural by-law is simply because of a lack of desire 
to become embroiled in the internal squabbles of the council. 
The officer presiding over the council meeting is the authority 
to whom an appeal on procedure must be made. If  not satisfied 
with his ruling, an appeal can be made to the entire council. 
The courts have never considered themselves as an appellate 
court from decisions of council, at least on questions of pro­
cedure.
The decisions indicate that the rule is one of general appli­
cation. In Hirsh v. Town of Winnipeg Beach269 Miller J. A. in­
dicated that, since the members of council who were present 
did not object, any procedural defect would not be fatal.
In Heffernan v. Municipal Corporation of Walkerton260 
Street J. was more emphatic:
. . . the provisions of the [procedural] by-law  . . . are 
binding upon the council, and can be insisted upon by 
any member, and a by-law  passed in disregard of its 
provisions, and of the protest of the minority should 
not be supported, when it is properly attacked.
As indicated in both of these decisions, there must be some 
protest by a member of the council. It may well be that only a 
councillor would have status to question the by-law under these 
circumstances.
Throughout the cases the attitude has been that procedural 
by-laws are concerned only with a matter of internal regulation 
of council business and therefore objections to their violation 
are open only to council members. No cognizance seems to 
have been taken of the fact that the procedure is laid down by 
by-law. It is an accepted fact that the Crown is not bound by 
statute, unless made expressly subject thereto, but no similar 
exemption has been extended to a municipality. It has always 
been assumed that a by-law could only be amended by proper 
legislation specifically enacted for that purpose. Merely by 
ignoring or disregarding the by-law the situation will not be 
altered. The council has no higher or greater right to disregard 
or violate a by-law than does any individual resident subject to 
its control. The only right enjoyed by it, which is foreign to 
the individual, is the right of alteration.
An argument might possibly be made that, by passing a 
by-law contrary to the provisions of the procedural by-law, the 
council has by implication revoked the procedural requirements. 
Revocation by implication will usually only be effected where 
the two enactments deal with the same subject matter. The
259 (1961), 26 D.L.R. (2d) 659 (Man.).
260 (1903), 6 O.L.R. 79, at p. 86.
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intention could not be imputed to council of revoking the re­
quirements. The argument would not be an acceptable one.
A great deal may depend on the form in which the by-law 
is drafted. If  it is merely directory, non-compliance should not 
be fatal. If, on the other hand, it is in mandatory terms, one 
would be inclined to adopt the view of Henry J. in Wright v. 
Incorporated Synod of the Diocese of Huron261 that anything 
done contrary to it is void. To countenance a disregard of one 
by-law by the municipality is to do so in other areas as well.
It is submitted that, if the procedural by-law is in manda­
tory form, council must follow it on pain of having its enact­
ments struck down. By passing such a provision, council has 
held out to the residents of the municipality the manner in 
which business will be conducted. If the provisions can be 
arbitrarily abandoned, the rights of a resident may be abro­
gated. It is only too obvious that councils, particularly in On­
tario, have given zoning by-laws all readings at one meeting 
merely for the purpose of defeating the rights of an applicant 
for a building permit.262 These rights could be more adequate­
ly safeguarded if at least substantial compliance with the pro­




• STATUTORY PR EREQ U ISITES
It is not uncommon for enabling legislation to require the 
doing of some specific act before a council is seized with juris­
diction to implement its provisions.263 The court is continually 
confronted with situations where there has been varying com­
pliance with these prerequisites.
If the attack on the by-law is made pursuant to statutory 
proceedings to quash, the applicant will be confronted with the 
discretionary power of the court. The illegality resulting from 
non-compliance with a statutory prerequisite could only be 
shown by extraneous evidence. In the early years of the de­
velopment of this procedure, illegality could not be established 
in this manner. It was only by means of an incidental attack 
that the by-law could be effectively attacked.
One question which always arises is how conclusive must 
the evidence be before the courts will hold that a statutory con­
261 (1885), 11 S.C.R. 95.
262 See, for examole, City of Ottawa et al. v. Boyd Builders Ltd., 
[1965] S .C .R .'408.
263 In seme instances petitions are required before council can 
act. In these situations the sufficiency of the petition filed 
must be considered. In some jurisdictions notice of intention 
to consider the passing of a by-law  must be published.
dition has not been complied with. The onus is always on the 
person alleging the non-compliance even though many of the 
facts essential to establish it are known only to the municipal 
officials.
Perhaps the most expeditious manner of determining the 
development of the law with regard to statutory conditions is 
to examine one type of prerequisite. The development in one 
area is similar to that in all others. One of the early statutory 
requirements with which the courts were concerned was that of 
notice.
In Lanson v. Township of Reach264 it was recognized that 
the purpose of giving notice of the intended consideration of 
a by-law was to enable interested persons to appear and object. 
If die notices were not clear and precise, they would serve no 
useful purpose. In that case the Court in its wisdom left the 
applicant to raise the objection on a prosecution for nuisance 
resulting from the obstruction of a road allowance. A similar 
conclusion was reached in Re Standley and Municipality of Ves- 
pra and Sunnidale.265 The material difference in this case was 
that the applicant was very much aware of what was transpiring. 
In fact he had been heard by council. There was also some 
evidence that notice had been given.
The early approach seemed to be to ask whether the ob­
ject of the legislative condition has been obtained, not whether 
the statute has been strictly complied with. If it was obvious 
that the plaintiff was aware that the by-law was going to be 
considered, he could not later suggest that the notice published 
was improper.266 Once it was shown that no notice or no proper 
notice as required by the statute had been given, a burden was 
cast upon the municipal respondent to establish that the non- 
compliance had not affected the result.267 This would seem in 
most cases to be an impossible burden.268
264 (1860)T 19 U.C.Q.B. 591.
265 (1859), 17 U.C.Q.B. 69.
266 Re Robinson and Village of Beamsville (1906), 8 O.W.R. 689 
(High Ct.).
267 As stated by Riddell J . in Re Begg and Township of Dun- 
wich (1910), 21 O.L.R. 94, at p. 99, quoting Osier J . A. in Re 
Pickett and Township of Wainfleet (1897), 28 O.R. 464, at 
p. 467: “ ‘the onus of proving that the omission to comply 
with’ the statutory direction ‘has not affected the result is 
upon the respondents.’ ” See also Re Angus and Township 
of Widdifield (1911), 24 O.L.R. 318 (Div. Ct.).
268 In re Young and Township of Binbrook (1899), 31 O.R. 108 
(Div. Ct.), where a large number of voters were improperly 
prevented from voting, it was held that the onus had been 
met. The most that could be expected is that all of the dis­
qualified voters would have voted against the by-law . When 
the number of votes, equal to the number of disqualified 
voters, were added to the negative votes cast, there were 
btill sufficient on the affirm ative side to approve it. No con­
sideration was given to the effect that the improper act of 
the municipal officials may have had on other voters.
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Much of the early uncertainty and perhaps laxity in requir­
ing strict compliance with the statute stemmed from the uncer­
tainty of the court itself in the area of summary applications to 
quash. For example, in Wannamaker v. Green269 where it was 
necessary for the plaintiff to prove a by-law to substantiate his 
claim, strict proof was required by Armour J.:
It is to be borne in mind that this is not the case of an 
application by the defendants to quash the by-law  in 
question where the Court might or might not give ef­
fect to the objection as to posting up and publication, 
although I think they ought; but it is the case of a 
plaintiff bringing an action which he can maintain only 
by establishing this to be a valid by-law , and to do this 
it is necessary for him to shew that the conditions pre­
cedent to the right of the council to pass this by-law  
have been complied with.
The approach taken on a summary application is perhaps 
best stated in In Re Castcell and Rural Municipality of South 
Norfolk:210
On an application, therefore, to quash a by-law  the con­
sideration of the questions to be determined should be 
undertaken in the spirit and with the object of ascer­
taining whether there has been a substantial compliance 
with all the requirements of the statute, and not of 
finding some slight or trival departure on which to 
hinge a decision adverse to the validity of the by-law .
and further in the same decision:271
Where, however, there has been a virtual compliance 
with the statute and the departures complained of have 
been rather from the letter than from the spirit of the 
enactment, the court has discretion in determining 
whether there has been a sufficient compliance, and 
whether effect should be given to the objections on an 
application to quash.
If the validity of a by-law was incidental to the creation 
and maintenance of a private right, the plaintiff was required to 
prove that the municipality had complied stricdy with the stat­
utory requirements. On an application to quash, if substantial 
compliance was shown, the application would be dismissed. 
In some circumstances in this proceeding certain presumptions 
might be made against the applicant. If it was established that 
he had been involved in instigating the introduction and pas­
sage of the by-law, then he would be deemed to have waived
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269 (1885), 10 O.R. 457, at p. 468. A sim ilar approach was taken  
in W inter v. K cow n  (1863), 22 U.C.Q.B. 341. There seems to  
be no presumption in favour of the validity of the by-law  
when a plaintiff must prove it to make out his case.
270 (1905), 15 Man. R. 620 (K .B.), at p. 623. See also Re Johnston  
and Township of Tilbury East (1911), 25 O.L.R. 242 (C.A.).
271 15 Man. R., at pp. 622-623.
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the benefits of the statutory requirements.272 The doctrine of 
estoppel might also involved against the applicant. It must now 
be taken as settled that an applicant cannot be estopped from 
relying on a statutory condition.273
In some situations, even if the enabling legislation has not 
been complied with, the courts refuse to strike down the by­
law. This has occurred in cases where the effect of the by-law 
is spent,274 where substantial amounts of money have been 
raised under it,275 where the defect could be rectified by it be­
ing repassed and the conditions met, or where there was no in­
tention to violate the statute but an innocent mistake was 
made.276
After years of uncertainty, the position became solidified at 
least in relation to enactments resulting in an interference with 
property or other common law rights. With regard to this type 
of by-law, the law as stated by Strong J. in O’Brien v. Cogs­
well-11 has been accepted:
The general principle applicable to the construction of 
statutes imposing and regulating the enforcem ent of 
taxes for general and municipal purposes are well 
settled. Enactm ents of this class are to be construed  
strictJy, and in all cases of ambiguity which m ay arise 
that construction is to be adopted which is most favour­
able to the subject. Further, all steps prescribed by the 
statute to be taken in the process either of imposing or 
levying the tax  are to be considered essential and in­
dispensable unless the statute expressly provides that 
their omission shall not be fatal to the legal validity of
272 See the judgment of Meredith J .  A. in Re Johnston and 
Township of Tilbury East (1911), 25 O.L.R. 242.
273 Garrow J . A. in Re Johnston and Township of Tilbury East 
(1911), 25 O.L.R. 242, was extrem ely doubtful if estoppel 
could apply. See also Township of M cKillop  v. Township of 
Loqan (1899), 29 S.C.R. 702 (judgment of Strong J .) ;  Tonks 
v.Reid, [1967] S.C.R. 81; White v. Rural Municipality of 
Louise (1891), 7 Man. R. 231 (K .B.).
274 Grant and Township of Puslinch (1868), 27 U.C.Q.B. 154.
275 Boulton and Town of P eterborough  (1858), 16 U.C.Q.B. 380.
276 Re Vandyke and Village of Grimsby  (1906), 12 O.L.R. 211 
(Div. Ct.): In re  Huson and Township of South Norwich 
(1892), 19 O.A.R. 343.
277 (1890), 17 S.C.R. 420, at pp. 424-425. See also W anderers In ­
vestm ent Company  v. City of W innipeg (1917), 27 Man. R. 
450 (K .B .); In re Huson and Township of South Norwich 
(1892), 19 O.A.R. 343; Re Ostrom and Township of Sidney  
(1888). 15 O.A.R. 372; Re G reig and City of Toronto, [1934] 
457 (High C t.); Cassis v. St. Thomas, [19431 1 D.L.R. 623 
(Ont. Sup C t.); In re Robertson and Township of North 
Easthope (1899). 16 O.A.R. 214; Springfield  Farm  D evelop­
m ents Ltd. v. Rural Municipality of North Kildonan  (1965). 
53 D.L.R. (2d) 95 (Man. Q.B.).
O.R. 514 (High C t.); W annamaker v. G reen  (1885), 10 O.R.
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the proceedings; in other words, the provisions requir­
ing notices to be given and other formalities to be ob­
served are to be construed as imperative, and not as 
m erely directory, unless the contrary is expressly de­
clared.
An allegation of non-compliance with a condition prece­
dent to jurisdiction must be subjected to the principles enunci­
ated in the O'Brien case. If the non-compliance is established, 
the by-law must be struck down.
An examination of the decisions dealing with the publica­
tion of notice of intention to consider a by-law indicate how 
strict a compliance with the statute will be exacted by the 
courts. In Re Ostrom and Township of Sidney278 Osier J. A. 
said:
That notice is to be given in the prescribed manner to 
the persons who may be prejudicially affected by the 
act, in order, it may be supposed, to enable them to 
deliberate upon the course they will adopt in reference 
to it and unless both the first and last days are excluded  
they do not get a whole month for that purpose.
The notice requirement will not be met unless it is clear 
and explicit. As stated in In re Birdsall et al. and Township of 
Asphodel:2™
A general announcement that the council intended to 
ciass a by-law for this purpose conveys no information 
to the public as to when it is to take place in a month 
or six months or at any future time the council may 
choose to take the m atter up . . .
. . . the Legislature must have certainly meant by the 
words used to have required a time to be named at 
which those interested could attend and be heard . . . 
any person desiring to be heard would be bound to ob­
tain by personal inquiry the necessary information, 
which I think the statute required the council to give 
to him in the published notices.
The courts accepted the proposition that the legislature 
meant exactly what it said, and it was not for the courts to con­
sider the wisdom of these provisions. Many of the earlier de­
cisions indicating that strict compliance with the statute will
278 (1888), 15 O.A.R. 372, at p. 377. See also Hall v. Rural M u­
nicipality of South Norfolk  (1892), 8 Man. R. 430 (Q.B.). The 
technical requirements of the publication are described in 
cases such as In re  Coe and Township of Pickering  (1865),
24 U.C.Q.B. 439; In re Miles and Township of Richmond  
(1809), 28 U.C.Q.B. 333; Town of Dauphin  v. Cottick (1959), 
21 D.L.R. (2d) 719 (Man. C.A.). The Coe and Miles cases 
were reluctantly followed in B rophy and Village of Gana- 
voque  (1876). 26 U.C.C.P. 290.
279 (1880), 45 U.C.Q.B. 149, at pp. 152-153. See also In re  La- 
plante and Town of P eterborough  (1884), 5 O.R. 634 (High 
Ct.).
not be necessary are explained on the basis that it was not es­
tablished that a notice nad not been given.280 In cases where 
the applicant had actually appeared before the council but there 
was some doubt as to the requirements having been met, the 
applicant’s appearance was treated as confirming the fact of 
proper notice. It is now acknowledged that the function of the 
courts is to ascertain if there has in fact been strict compliance 
with the condition precedent. On any application to quash a 
by-law it will be presumed, until the contrary is shown, that all 
statutory prerequisites to the passing of the by-law have been 
complied with.281
If notice is required by the statute, it is not necessary for 
the applicant to prove that he has been injured by the lack of 
notice or that some different result would have necessarily fol­
lowed the giving of proper notice.282
Any condition which must be met in order to confer juris­
diction on council must be strictly complied with, and any fail­
ure to do so will be fatal.283 In this respect, notice is no dif­
ferent than any other condition precedent. For example, if a 
petition is necessary before council has authority to pass an 
early closing or other by-law, and the required number of sig­
natures are not appended thereto, or the proper person has not 
initiated the petition, any by-law passed in pursuance to the 
petition will be bad.284 Similarly, if the by-law which is final­
ly enacted is different from the action requested in the petition, 
this will also prove to be fatal.285 If the council has jurisdiction 
to pass the by-law without the necessity of a petition, the en­
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280 Rt Ostrovi and Township of Sidney  (1888), 15 O.A.R. 372; 
In re Birdsall et al. and Township of Asphodel (1880), 46 
U.C.Q.B. 149.
2ol Lafferty  v. Municipal Council of Wentworth and Halton 
(1851), 8 U.C.Q.B. 232.
282 As stated in Re Cross and Town of Gladstone (1905), 15 
Man. R. 528, at pp. 534-535: “It may be, and probably is, the 
fact that all interested parties really knew in advance of 
the intention to have the third reading on the 5th of June. 
But in face of the requirements of the statute I cannot as­
sume that they so knew, or even that, if they did know, 
those requirements could be treated as im m aterial.”
283 Rex ex rel. Donald v. Thompson (1929), 24 Sask L.R. 4 
(C.A.); Re Howard and City of Toronto (1928), 61 O.L.R. 563 
(C .A.); Township of Waterloo v. Town of Berlin  (1904), 8
O.L.R. 335 (judgment of Garrow J . A .); In re Salter and 
Township of Beckwith (1902), 4 O.L.R. 51 (High Ct.).
284 Halladay v. City of Ottawa (1907), 14 O.L.R. 458 (High Ct.), on 
appeal (1907), 15 O.L.R. 65; Re Greig and City of Toronto, 
[1934| O.R. 514 (High C t.); City of Sarnia v. McMurphy 
(1920), 47 O.L.R. 496 (C.A.); Township of McKillop v. Town­
ship of Logan (1899), 29 S.C.R. 702.
285 Cassis v. St. Thomas, [1943] 1 D.L.R. 623 (Ont. Sup. C t.); 
Rex ex rel. Donald v. Thompson (1929), 24 Sask L.R. 4 (C.A.).
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actment itself is not bad simply because a petition originating 
the legislation is defective.286
A zoning by-law is an interference with the common law 
right to enjoyment of property. Therefore, any prerequisite or 
statutory conditions precedent will be strictly construed and 
•enforced.
In Ontario there are no statutory prerequisites which must 
be met before a zoning by-law can be passed. This is not the 
situation in all other provinces.
In New Brunswick, for example, the Community Planning 
Act287 sets out a number of prerequisites. Before a council can 
enact any zoning by-law a notice must be published of its in­
tention so to do. In addition, the notice must specify at what 
particular council meeting objections will be heard. This is 
clearly a condition precedent which must be complied with in 
order to confer any jurisdiction to enact a zoning by-law.
When notice is given, the area subject to the proposed en­
actment is described. For example, let us assume that council
fjroposes to rezone a large tract of land. A valid notice is pub- ished describing the affected properties. After having heard 
objections, it is decided not to rezone the entire property de­
scribed. Can an area smaller than that described be rezoned 
without the necessity of a new notice?
That a larger area than that described could not be rezoned 
is clear.288 Equally true is the fact that no different zone from 
the one advertised can be created. In the situation mentioned, 
the zone remains the same, only the applicable area is different. 
It is difficult to conceive of any valid objection to council pro­
ceeding in this manner. No one has been mislead or prejudiced. 
All those whose property might be affected were notified. In 
this situation, if the notice was proper, there would seem to be 
no sufficient reason why the council could not proceed and 
■deal with the smaller area.
Another possible problem can also be demonstrated through 
example. Let us assume that an agreement has been made with 
an industrial concern. One of the conditions of the industry 
establishing in the city is the rezoning of a particular parcel of 
land, which the city through council undertakes to do. Would 
a zoning by-law enacted under these circumstances be valid?
It is an accepted principle of law that a body which is the 
recipient of delegated legislative powers cannot abrogate those
286 Re M cAlpine and Village of Bancroft, [1935] O.W.N. 53 
(High Ct.).
287 S.N.B. 1960-61, c. 6, as amended by 1963 (2nd sess.), c. 13; 
1964, c. 18; 1965, c. 12; 1966, c. 152; 1968, c. 21.
288 White v. Rural Municipality of Louise (1891), 7 Man. R. 231 
(Q.B.).
powers and thereby decline to carry out its proper powers and 
duties.289
A situation similar to that outlined above came before the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal in Vancouver v. Registrar, 
Vancouver Land Registration District.m  Davey J. A., with 
whom Sloan C. J. concurred, answered the problem in this way:
. . . the City bound itself without reservation or quali­
fication [to rezone]. . . .  By so doing the City bound 
itself, and thereby the council (through whom it must 
act) to disregard all objections to its passage, though 
the objectors had a statutory right to have their objec­
tions considered and determined upon their merits when 
the by-law  was presented for hearing. The agreem ent 
impaired the discretion vested in the council by the 
Town Planning Act for the protection of the competing 
and conflicting interests of property owners affected by 
the proposed amending by-law  and the interests of the 
community as a whole. By authorizing the City to en­
ter into this agreement, the council abdicated its statu­
tory duties, and bound itself, through the City, not to 
carry them out as required by law.
The decision clearly indicates that a council cannot do any 
act which will have the effect of depriving it of the power to 
effectively carry out its statutory duties. On the basis of this 
case it would seem that, given a situation similar to that in the 
example, an applicant could successfully attack the rezoning 
by-law.
Under the New Brunswick Community Planning Act any 
application to rezone must be referred to the Planning Com­
mission for an opinion. Council is not bound by that opinion 
but, if it enacts a by-law which does not conform to that opin­
ion, the by-law must be passed by a two-thirds majority of the 
full council.
This is an illustration of some of the possibilities open to 
a person attacking a zoning by-law for failing to comply with 
the conditions precedent. It is submitted that if there is not 
strict compliance with these provisions any by-law enacted must 
be struck down. [To be concluded]
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